

International Development

Issues and Challenges

Third edition

Damien Kingsbury

John McKay

Janet Hunt

Mark McGillivray

Matthew Clarke



palgrave

© Damien Kingsbury, John McKay, Janet Hunt, Mark McGillivray
and Matthew Clarke, 2008, 2012, 2016

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First edition 2008
Second edition 2012
Third edition 2016

Published by
PALGRAVE

Palgrave in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of 4 Crinan Street,
London, N1 9XW.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave is a global imprint of the above companies and is represented
throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-137-42941-4 hardback

ISBN 978-1-137-42940-7 paperback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Contents

<i>List of Figures and Tables</i>	ix
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	x
Introduction	1
<i>Damien Kingsbury</i>	
Origins of the 'development' paradigm	1
Varied development experiences	5
Measuring development?	7
The failure of development	10
About this book	12
1 What is Development?	21
<i>Mark McGillivray</i>	
Traditional meanings of development	22
Contemporary meanings of development	29
Applying development definitions	40
Conclusion	48
2 Reassessing Development Theory	50
<i>John McKay</i>	
The global context for development ideas and policies	52
Theories of modernization	56
The challenge of dependency theory	59
The Asian miracle: challenges for modernization and dependency approaches	63
The rise of neoliberalism: globalization and development theory	66
The global financial crisis and emerging challenges to neoliberalism	70
3 The Economics of Development	78
<i>John McKay</i>	
The main drivers of growth: competing schools of thought	81
Policies to stimulate growth	92
Growth and development in a globalizing world: towards a new paradigm?	100

This chapter is substantially revised and rewritten in the light of recent experiences and new theoretical advances. The impact of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria – and the subsequent rise of Islamic State – the spillover of the Afghanistan war into Pakistan, and the expansion of anti-state militarism into other parts of the Middle East such as Yemen are considered. This then begs the question regarding the meaning of the word ‘terrorism’ and its capacity to impact upon development in ways not previously considered. McKay reflects on the new work on the concept of the failed (or failing) states, employing the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a relevant case study. The limits to effectiveness of international intervention in these matters have also become much clearer, and the implication of this is also evaluated.

As noted at the outset, much of the world continues to focus on issues of development and, when attention is properly turned, it is widely recognized that the problems of development are global in both their reach and their potential impact. Yet at the same time the urgency felt by some about such global development issues is far from shared by all, and has resulted in this retreat from tackling the complex issues. The reduction to increasingly simplistic formulae for addressing the continuing problems of development reflects the ‘fatigue’ that has, in various forms, beset many wealthier countries in relation to poorer countries. Much of this, in turn, can be attributed to the lack of ideological imperative that characterized the period from around 1950 to 1990. A new ideological imperative – that of neo-liberalism – has prevailed but it has been less generous, less sympathetic (and much less empathetic) and fairly inflexible in the choices that it has offered. It is also itself now under increasing challenge, as countries and the citizens within them reject imposed austerity which has been argued – and in some cases shown – to actually make their problems worse rather than better.

This book, then, attempts to discuss these key issues and explore some of the ways forward for development in this evolving period of global reorganization. If it provides questioning material to work with and to consider critically, it will have gone a long way towards achieving its primary goal.

Note

1. The common basis for this ideology is the fundamentalist Salafi interpretation of Sunni Islam, based on the first three generations after the Prophet Mohamad. A violent interpretation of Salafism is that which informs most so-called ‘jihadi’ organizations.

Chapter 1

What is Development?

Mark McGillivray

The term ‘development’ is one that has many different meanings. While many overlap, some inherently contradict each other. To many people development is either a process or outcome that is often bad in terms of its impact on people and the societies in which they live. Some others see development as both a process and an outcome, and as necessarily good. These people see development as something that should be actively sought after. And to complicate matters further, there are many others who define development in many different ways. This chapter broadly attempts to identify, explain and resolve those issues by introducing and outlining various conceptualizations of development. Such an exercise is an important one: if we are to study something, it is essential to first understand what we are studying. It is especially important in a study of development, for without a definition of this term we cannot determine whether a country is achieving higher levels of development, or whether it should be considered developed, developing or underdeveloped. It is also important for development practice. Development practitioners, irrespective of whether they are involved in policy, planning or in implementing development projects, need a working definition of what it is they are seeking to achieve.

This chapter looks at various definitions of development. Such an exercise necessarily requires an examination of theoretical material about what development is or ought to be. The chapter adopts a largely chronological examination, given that many new definitions are actually responses to earlier ones. To understand the latter, one first needs to understand the former. The chapter commences by introducing and critiquing various traditional or early meanings or conceptualizations of development. This is a deliberately brief discussion. More detailed treatments can be found in Leftwich (2000), Hunt (1989) and, in particular, Cowen and Shenton (1996). The chapter then examines more contemporary meanings of development, those which emerged from the 1960s to the present. These meanings either treat development as domination and exploitation of one group by another or as what

might very loosely be described as 'good change'. The chapter favours the use of the second meaning, largely because it forces us to reflect on what sort of change or outcomes we want to see in all countries, rich and poor, providing a framework to compare actual changes against those we would like to observe. It also allows us to consider which countries, and, within countries, which people, should be prioritized in efforts to improve the human condition.

The chapter focuses predominantly on various conceptualizations that are consistent with the 'good change' approach, many that are provided by the literature on human well-being. This is followed by an empirical examination of the development record in a manner consistent with some of these conceptualizations. This involves looking at country achievements, or in some cases lack thereof, in health, education, income and related indicators. Finally, a balance sheet is provided that looks at what might be perceived as 'goods' and 'bads' and which asks us to judge whether 'development' has actually occurred. It is argued that this is essentially a subjective exercise, and a complicated one at that, which requires one to reflect on one's own personal values to judge what is important and what is not.

Traditional meanings of development

Historical progress and modernization

To many people, development means the use of natural resources to supply infrastructure, build roads and dams and provide electricity and other forms of energy, to productively utilize or exploit previously unused areas of land or to devise new forms of technology for productive use. For others, it can simply be an ordered or linked set of events or changes. It is not uncommon for someone to refer to the 'next development' in something, be it an individual's life story, a novel, a movie or a sports event or, more to the current point, a town or city, region or nation. These meanings correspond, arguably, with what most laypeople would mean by 'development'.

These layperson's definitions of development are broadly consistent, to varying degrees, with more formal definitions that were dominant in the academic and policy literatures and embraced by most development practitioners during the 1950s to late 1960s. They still appear in some literatures and are embraced by some practitioners even today, but are far less dominant. Some have their origins in literature dating back many centuries. Most, if not all, overlap to varying degrees and some are differentiated only by subtle variations. For our current purposes,

it is sufficient to outline two that are arguably the most dominant. The definitions treat development as either historical progress or modernization. Let us briefly discuss each in turn.

Development as *historical progress* refers to the unfolding of human history, over a long period of time, in a manner that is thought to be progressive. The evolution of capitalism is often put forward as an example of historical progress. Key to this definition is what is understood as progress, and deciding whether certain historical changes are progressive is not a straightforward task. It is made all the less straightforward by many different conceptualizations of progress. The modern view of progress is based on a philosophical notion that is equated with a steady onward process, brought about by human agency, that results in a systematic transformation of the world. Human agency is in turn seen as the application of human abilities, such as intelligence and initiative.

Development, defined as historical progress, is very much linked to the Western European experience from the late eighteenth century onward. This experience saw the emergence of more materially affluent societies, the application of improved technologies that resulted among other things in better communication and transportation, greater human freedom and, in time, improvements in health and education levels.

Development as *modernization* has been described in many different ways. This very influential conceptualization of development is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this book, so here we provide broad details only. Modernization is a process whereby societies move through a fundamental, complete structural transition from one condition to another, from a starting point to an end point. The starting point is viewed as a traditional society which develops into an advanced, modern society. This is associated with a shift in the structure of an economy, away from a reliance on the agricultural sector. This shift sees a greater reliance over time on the industrial sector, with an increasingly large proportion of an economy's output coming from manufacturing activities. Eventually it also sees the rise of a services sector which includes the providers of health and educational services, finance, transportation and professional advice.

It should be emphasized that in its proper context modernization not only involves an economic transformation but profound social, cultural, ideological, institutional and political changes as well. In an influential paper, Huntington (1971) describes modernization as a process in which societies have more control over their natural and social environment due to the use of superior scientific and technical knowledge. Moreover, according to Huntington, the economic, social and political structures and processes actually converge over time.

Development defined as modernization or historical progress is evident in the works of two well-known writers, Walt Rostow and Karl Marx. Examining these works allows us to better understand these definitions. Rostow proposed what is known as the 'stages theory' of economic growth in his famous book published in 1960 (Rostow 1960). The growth to which Rostow refers is in the economy or economic growth, measured by year-on-year changes in the overall level of production. Rostow's theory is also discussed in the next chapter which mainly focuses on the context in which this theory was proposed. Here our focus is on the meaning of development implicit to the Rostow theory.

Rostow's stages of economic growth

Rostow's theory is that societies pass through five stages. A society or country can be considered to be *developing* as it passes through these stages and as *developed* as it reaches the final stages. And, as we shall shortly note, development is very much defined in terms of material advancement. Often this type of development is called *economic development*. The first is a *traditional society* stage. This stage is characterized by low levels of productivity and technology. The economy is dominated by the agricultural sector, with most people living and working on the land. The social structure of agricultural life is very hierarchical and there is little upward mobility: people who are born poor remain poor, and successive generations are often no better off than each other. Economic growth is very low or non-existent.

The second stage is when societies commence a process of transition. This is when the preconditions for what is termed 'take-off' into rapid and sustained growth are put in place. Accordingly, this is the *preconditions for take-off* stage. Entrepreneurial activity emerges, with a class of people willing and able to save from their incomes, thereby creating a pool of funds that can be invested. Banks and other institutions that facilitate these activities emerge, with an increase in investment in transport and communications. Modern technologies are also utilized.

The third stage is *take-off*. During this stage there are further technical advances in both industry and agriculture, the entrepreneurial class expands, new and profitable industries emerge and quickly expand and previously unexploited natural resources are increasingly used in production. This stage is characterized by two key factors which differentiate it from the previous stage. The first is that institutional resistances to steady economic growth are largely removed. These resistances might

be, for example, a class of people whose interests are to retard general economic advancement, such as a landed or elite class that wants a pool of cheap labour. The second is that there are large increases in the incomes of those who not only save increasingly larger shares of this income but make these savings available to those wanting to invest in modern sectors of the economy. Savings increase by up to approximately 10 per cent of national income in the take-off stage.

Take-off is followed a long interval of sustained, although fluctuating, progress as the now regularly growing economy drives to apply modern technology throughout its entire economy. This is the fourth stage, known as the *drive to maturity*. Savings and investment is in the vicinity of 10 to 20 per cent of national income and the growth of national output and income regularly exceeds that of the population. The economy is now involved extensively in international trade. Commodities that were once produced at home are imported and purchased using funds obtained from exporting other commodities abroad. New industries emerge and older ones either disappear or taper off. The society adjusts its values and institutions in ways that support the growth process. Maturity is reached 40 or so years after the end of the take-off stage.

The final stage in the Rostow theory is the *age of high mass-consumption* in which the country or society is truly developed. Upon reaching this stage, societies no longer accept the ongoing application of modern technology as the fundamental objective. The consumer is king, with the economy being primarily geared towards the production of consumer durables and services on a mass basis. The leading sectors of the economy are those that supply these goods and services. Cars, television sets, washing machines, cooking equipment and leisure are the focus of productive efforts. Material prosperity is higher than ever and this modern society can unambiguously be considered as developed. Importantly, while this prosperity might not be very evenly distributed in this modern society, it would be enjoyed by all sections within it. Those who were once poor would no longer be so because economic expansion would ensure high levels of employment and a high demand for employees would ensure higher wages. This spreading of the benefits of growth to the poor is referred to as 'trickle-down', a crucial characteristic of theories such as Rostow's.

Marx's stages of historical development

Marx, in his writings first published in the second half of the nineteenth century, envisaged four stages of historical development (Marx 1970a,

1970b, 1970c, 1972). As with Rostow's stages, the implicit message from Marx's treatment of history is that a society is *developing* as it passes through each stage and achieves a higher level of *development* along the way. The level of freedom enjoyed by individuals and the ownership of private property differentiates stages. The first of Marx's stages is the *primal stage*. Individuals are overwhelmingly concerned with satisfying the most basic of human needs such as food, clothing and shelter. Higher notions such as self-expression and individual freedoms are not entertained until basic survival is ensured. All societies are thought to emerge from this primal stage.

The second stage of historical development is the *feudal stage*, in which private property exists but is held by the aristocracy. The aristocracy oppresses and alienates but at the same time is dependent upon the masses which are the subordinate serf class. This stage provides no freedom or opportunity for self-fulfilment, and increased production is achieved through the direct exploitation of the majority.

Feudalism is followed by the *capitalist stage*. The capitalist society provides private property and productivity capacity grows rapidly. An entrepreneurial, capitalist class emerges that seeks out commercial opportunity. A more modern and technically advanced economy consequently emerges that relies less on agriculture and more on industry. Marx was of the view that capitalism was best suited to achieve increases in the productive capacity of the economy. Individual freedom is, however, withheld from the proletariat working class. This class is both exploited and impoverished, and remains alienated through its submission to wage labour. The capitalist class is enriched by the expansion of the productive capacity of the economy.

Marx's historical stages of development culminate in the fourth stage, *communism*. The enrichment of the capitalist class and the impoverishment of the proletariat in the capitalist stage would ultimately lead to the latter overthrowing the former. The proletariat would, in particular, seize the means of production, transferring it to public or collective ownership, and encourage social relations that would benefit everyone equally. True freedom for the proletariat would then be achieved. This society would reject all previous values, realizing that class is an artificial creation and perpetuated by rulers interested only in ensuring their own self-interests and survival. That the productive capacity of the economy has been built up under the capitalist stage and the sharing of the benefits of this capacity are equal means that everyone's living standards in this society are relatively high.

A critique

Traditional meanings of development, implicit or otherwise, came under great scrutiny from the late 1960s onward. Understanding this scrutiny requires us to outline the main measures of development that corresponded to these meanings. Consistent with the traditional conceptualizations of development, in particular that which equated development with modernization, was the use of the rate of growth of per capita national income, be it measured in terms of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP) or Gross National Income (GNI), as the main indicator of whether a country was developing. Some people went so far as to even equate per capita economic growth with development, defining the latter in terms of the former.

Also consistent with the early conceptualizations was the use of the *level* of per capita national income as the main indicator of the *level* of development that a country had achieved. The World Bank, for instance, classified countries on the basis of their GNPs per capita as either low, middle or high income. Countries belonging to the high-income group were widely considered as developed, while those in the low- and middle-income groups were often considered as less developed or developing countries. This does not mean that developed countries cannot also be developing, by achieving higher levels of development, just that the label 'developing' was assigned to the low- and middle-income groups. This practice continues today, but with the use of GNIs per capita for the year 2013. Low-income countries are defined as those with a GNI per capita of US\$1,045 or less in 2013, middle-income countries are those with a GNI per capita of more than US\$1,045 but less than US\$12,746 and high-income countries are those with a GNI per capita of US\$12,746 or more (World Bank 2014d).

It was observed in the late 1960s and early 1970s that many economies that had followed a broadly Rostow-type modernization-led growth (or growth via modernization) strategy had achieved high rates of economic growth, with some achieving rather high incomes per capita. But this growth was not uniform, both among and within countries. Among countries, it was observed that rates of per capita economic growth in high-income countries far exceeded those of their low- and middle-income counterparts. For instance, between 1961 and 1970 the per capita national incomes in the high-income countries grew at an annual average rate of more than 4 per cent while over the same period the middle- and low-income countries grew at annual average rates of just over 3 and just under 1 per cent, respectively.

These differential growth rates, combined with the fact that initial incomes in the high-income countries are by definition higher than those of the low- and middle-income countries, meant that international inequalities in per capita incomes grew over time. The rich countries were getting richer and the poor countries, while also getting richer on average, were falling further and further behind. Put differently, the poor countries were becoming relatively poorer over time. High-income country income per capita was 45 times that of the low-income countries in 1960, a ratio that many observers thought was obscenely high. By 1970, however, the former were 56 times richer in terms of per capita income than the latter and 70 times richer by 1980 (World Bank 2007).

Arguably more disconcerting were inequalities within countries. Despite the positive and often high rates of growth that were experienced by the vast majority of developing countries, there remained large sections of the populations of these countries that were largely untouched by this growth. The lives of these people were still characterized by crushing, abject poverty while tiny minorities benefited enormously. The widespread perception among observers was, therefore, that the poor benefited little, if at all, from the growth via modernization strategies that had been pursued in the 1960s and earlier decades. Indeed, there were many that believed that some groups within developing societies were actually worse off as a result of these strategies, if not in terms of the incomes they earned but in terms of social upheaval and displacement, a loss of identity and cultural dislocation.

Statistics, while never adequately capturing the plight of the poor, do back up the views of the late 1960s' and early 1970s' critics of growth via modernization strategies. The experience within Latin American countries is often cited, Brazil in particular. Like many other countries in its region Brazil experienced very high rates of per capita income growth – between 6 and 11 per cent per year during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Yet large sections of the Brazilian population remained impoverished, as implied by income distribution statistics. Throughout the mid-1960s to mid-1970s, it is estimated that the poorest 10 per cent of the Brazilian population received less than 2 per cent of their nation's income. The richest 10 per cent of Brazil's population during this period is estimated to have received a little more than 40 per cent. By the early 1980s, the corresponding numbers were 1 and 45 per cent, respectively. Income poverty data are hard to obtain for the 1970s but by 1981, after further high if not volatile annual per capita national income growth outcomes, 31 per cent of the Brazilian population, some 39 million people, lived in poverty (World Bank 2007). Brazil might

well be considered an extreme example but it is broadly indicative of trends in the developing world as a whole. For instance, in 1981, after years of per capita income growth in the vast majority of countries, 67 per cent of the combined population of low- and middle-income countries lived in income poverty, some 2.5 billion people (World Bank 2007). Thus it appeared that while the developing world might have grown, the fruits of this growth were not widespread. In short, if there was any trickle-down it was clearly insufficient in its extent.

Such comments apply to those countries which followed what might broadly be considered a Rostow-type growth strategy. But broadly similar comments can be made about those countries that chose Marxism during the post-Second World War and subsequently Cold War era, the many countries that were part of the Eastern bloc of countries, including the Soviet Union. Most if not all of these countries had achieved industrialization and had overthrown their capitalist classes. But the freedoms expected for the masses, especially civil freedoms, were not enjoyed. Nor, in many cases, were the expected gains in material living standards.

Contemporary meanings of development

A number of alternative meanings of development emerged from the criticisms of the modernization strategies. Some of these meanings were implicit to alternative theories of development. By this it is meant that alternative explanations of the development experiences of countries were offered, and from these theories it is possible to infer a particular definition of development. In other cases, the meanings are the result of an explicit attempt to provide an alternative definition of development. Two broad types or classes of definitions emerged: those which defined development in a rather negative manner and those which defined it in a way that is necessarily good. Let us examine each in turn.

Development as domination and exploitation

That the gap in living standards between developed and developing countries had very substantially widened throughout the 1960s and 1970s and that many hundreds of millions of people still lived in poverty in the developing world led many commentators from the late 1960s to question some of the fundamental assumptions on which modernization theories and strategies were based. These commentators tended not to question the goals of modernization but the

assumption that all countries could follow a largely homogeneous development path, and that in particular what happened in the industrialized Western world could be largely replicated in poorer developing countries. What these commentators instead saw were large volumes of foreign trade between developed and developing countries and large increases in developed country foreign development aid and investment to developing countries in the apparent absence of the gains that these flows were supposed to generate. They saw countries that were marginalized and locked into a situation of underdevelopment, in which they were peripheral and subservient to and dependent on a global economy dominated by developed and multinational countries.

A leading proponent of this view was Andre Gunder Frank. Frank, like many others holding the same view, drew on the experiences of the Latin American countries. As Leftwich (2000) points out, these countries had a long and intimate engagement through investment and trade with the developed world, but the processes and features of development were thought by Frank and others to be retarded and deformed, constituting what came to be known as *underdevelopment*. Frank argued that 'development and underdevelopment are the opposite sides of the same coin' (Frank 1967: 33). The school of thought to which Frank and many others belonged believed development was not about, in effect, rapid growth that led to the sorts of societies envisaged by Rostow and other proponents of modernization-led economic growth but, rather, about the domination and exploitation by the rich developed countries of their poor underdeveloped (as distinct from developing) counterparts. It was not something for poorer countries to strive for but something that should be avoided at all costs. Further details of this school of thought are provided in the next chapter.

Development as good change

In an extremely influential work published initially in late 1969, Dudley Seers rejected the view that development was an objective or positive concept that, for example, described what was necessary for a country to achieve higher living standards for its citizens. Instead, he thought that development should be seen as a concept that requires us to identify the normative conditions for a universally acceptable aim, which for Seers was the '*realization of the potential of human personality*' (Seers 1972: 6, emphasis added). This conceptualization was a direct challenge to strategies that relied heavily on economic growth or that implicitly equated growth with development. He actually thought that

economic growth did not only solve certain social and political difficulties but could actually contribute to them.

Having defined development in terms of the realization of human potential, Seers' next task was to consider what was absolutely necessary for such realization. This led him to three related questions:

- What has been happening to income poverty?
- What has been happening to unemployment?
- What has been happening to income inequality?

Seers asserted that if all three of these phenomena had over time declined from high levels, then 'beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned' (Seers 1972: 7). He further asserted that 'if one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result "development" even if per capita income doubled' (Seers 1972: 7).

A reasonably clear case was provided for the singling out of these questions. Seers thought that human potential could not be realized without sufficient food, and that the ability to buy food is determined by income. Those living below an income poverty line cannot buy enough food to realize their human potential. Having a job – whether in paid employment, being a student, working on a family farm or keeping a house – was considered to be essential for the enhancement of one's personality and for self-respect. Inequality was linked to poverty. Seers argued that poverty could be reduced much more quickly if economic growth was accompanied by reduced inequality. He also saw equity as an objective in its own right, arguing that inequity was objectionable on ethical standards.

A point often overlooked in Seers' writings is that he thought that many other factors, in addition to the reduction of poverty, unemployment and inequality, were also important for the fulfilment of human potential. He thought that this fulfilment also required adequate education levels, freedom of speech and national political and economic sovereignty (Seers 1972).

The fundamental contribution of Seers was that development should be defined as a subjective or normative concept. Development is not about what actually has or will happen – as in the writings of Rostow and Marx who saw development as historical change, or those who defined development as exploitation and domination – but what ought to happen. In short, this is about differentiating between changes per se and that which we would like to see, that change which might simply be described as 'good'. This laid the groundwork for many new

development conceptualizations proposed from the early 1970s through to the present. Let us now highlight some of the better known of these conceptualizations.

In the early 1970s, the International Labour Organization (ILO) focused attention on the importance of employment in developing countries for providing for basic needs (ILO 1976). The efforts of the ILO and others led to the emergence of a new meaning, which treated development as the fulfilment or satisfaction of *basic human needs*. The corresponding measure of development became the extent to which these needs were met. Basic needs are often thought to be confined to food, shelter and clothing. The ILO identified five categories of basic human needs which go well beyond these. They are:

- basic goods, including food, shelter and clothing;
- basic services, including education, health, access to water and transport;
- participation in decision making;
- the fulfilment of basic human rights, and;
- productive employment, that which generates enough income to satisfy consumption needs.

It should come as no surprise that the ILO's flagging of a list of needs was followed by much discussion about how they can best be fulfilled. There were those who believed that basic human needs could only be fulfilled through redistributive policies that result in a more equitable distribution of income, assets and power (Green 1978). Implicit to this view was that growth-oriented strategies could not satisfy basic human needs; strategies aimed at fulfilling the latter were actually a rejection of the former. The ILO, while not rejecting redistribution policies, was of the view that high rates of economic growth were essential for a successful basic human needs development strategy.

Many more elaborate needs were subsequently articulated in the years after the ILO came up with the basic human needs approach. They included those from Streeten (1979), Streeten et al. (1981), Stewart (1985) and, some years later, Doyal and Gough (1991). These articulations tended to focus more than the ILO on needs beyond the provision of basic goods and services, such as a sense of purpose in life and work, self-determination, political freedom and security and national and cultural identity. The issue of the universality of needs, across cultures and over time, was also examined. Doyal and Gough defined universal needs as preconditions for social participation that apply to everyone in the same way. They concluded that two universal

basic needs do exist – physical health and autonomy. Autonomy was viewed as the capacity to initiate an action that requires, among other things, the opportunity to engage in social action.

Discussions on development strategies and corresponding meanings of development were rich and engaging in the 1970s and early 1980s. The same cannot be said of the remainder of the 1980s. The early 1980s was a period of great economic turmoil in the developing world, largely owing to steep declines in oil prices. Many developing countries experienced serious balance of payments problems, growing public and private debt, declines in investment and high inflation. All of these problems culminated in lower economic growth rates than would have otherwise been the case. The dominant view at the time is that the best way to deal with these problems was with what might loosely be described as neoliberal economic policies, often aimed at less government economic intervention and, above all, a primary focus on sustained economic growth. The World Bank was an active and influential proponent of similar views. Such an environment was not conducive to a more interventionist development strategy, including one aimed at satisfying basic human needs. Strategies aiming to put basic human needs satisfaction first, that were consistent with a notion of development as something other than or in addition to economic growth, were not high on the agenda of national governments and international development organizations. The 1980s can, in this sense, be seen as a lost decade in terms of the advancement of development conceptualizations.

This state of affairs changed in 1990, with the release of the UNDP *Human Development Report 1990*. In an attempt to shift development thinking and strategies away from what was thought of as an excessive preoccupation with economic growth as a goal for development policies, and back to what it saw as core values, the UNDP advanced its concept of *human development*. The UNDP defined human development as follows:

Human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. If these essential choices are not available, many other opportunities remain inaccessible. But human development does not end there. (UNDP 1990: 10)

The UNDP was at pains to emphasize that its concept of development was broader and more vital than mere economic growth that achieved higher average incomes. It made the powerful point that income is not an end in its own right but a means to an end. What matters, according

to the UNDP, is not so much the level of income but the uses to which it is put. The UNDP invoked a powerful ally in advancing its position: the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. He had warned against judging societies by variables such as income and wealth that are sought not for themselves but desired as means to other objectives. Succinctly, Aristotle's view was that: 'Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking, for it is merely useful for the sake of something else' (UNDP 1990: 9).

The UNDP not only proposed its own definition of human development but also a measure designed to show which countries had achieved the highest levels of this development and which had achieved the lowest. More generally, the measure provided a league table, a ranking, of countries in terms of the levels of human development they had each achieved. That measure is the now famous Human Development Index (HDI). A detailed technical description of the HDI is not necessary for our current purposes but it combined measures of longevity, knowledge and the material standard of living into a single index. The HDI has changed since its inception in 1990 but in the original version these measures were life expectancy (the number of years a newborn child would be expected to live in a country given prevailing patterns of mortality), adult literacy (the percentage of persons aged 15 and over who can understand, read and write a short statement on everyday life) and a measure of GDP per capita adjusted for differences in the cost of living between countries (UNDP 1990). The HDI is now arguably the most widely used and reported measure of the level of development among countries. HDI scores have been published annually and are now available for more than 170 countries. The higher the score, the higher is the level of development that a country is considered to have achieved. We return to HDI scores later in this chapter.

The UNDP relied heavily on the work of Amartya Sen in articulating and designing the HDI. Sen was winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics for his contributions to the field of welfare economics. In the late 1970s, Sen began proposing what became known as the 'capability approach'. This was in the context of how inequality should be judged, with Sen arguing the case for looking at inequalities, not in variables such as income but in what he referred to as basic capabilities (Sen 1980). Indeed, Sen had long been critical of the use of income as a measure of development; the level of income or its growth was not as important as what it was used to purchase (Sen 1985a). To this extent he was in agreement with Aristotle. Accordingly, as Alkire (2002) points out, development in Sen's capability approach is not defined as an increase in income growth, or for that matter in terms of enhanced

education or health alone, but as an *expansion of capability*. Capability is treated as the *freedom* to promote or achieve combinations of valuable functionings (Sen 1990). Functionings, in turn, are the 'parts of the state of person – in particular the things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life' (Sen 1993: 31). The link between freedom and development was a theme Sen articulated further in subsequent writings. In his well-known work, *Development as Freedom* (Sen 1999a), he argued that the expansion of freedom is both a primary end and a principal means of development. More precisely, he argued that development involved the removal of the 'unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency' (Sen 1999a: xii).

So, what are these capabilities that allow one to function? Sen resists identifying a set of capabilities on the grounds that it is a value judgement that needs to be made explicitly, in many cases through a process of public debate (Sen 1999a). We need to keep this point in mind later in this chapter. Yet many others have identified various lists of capabilities, or what might be interpreted as such. The UNDP has done so, in its definition of human development and choice of components of, or dimensions of development empirically captured by, the HDI. This was made clear in the *Human Development Report 1995*:

The basis for selection of critical dimensions, and the indicators that make up the human development index, is identifying basic capabilities that people must have to participate in and contribute to society. These include the ability to lead a long and healthy life, the ability to be knowledgeable and the ability to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living. (UNDP 1995: 18)

A comprehensive list of often complex capabilities is provided by Martha Nussbaum, among others. Many of these are most applicable or easy to understand at the level of an individual but can also be applied in varying degrees to countries, based on the life situations of their citizens. Nussbaum's list has been revised many times but in 2000 consisted of the following: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination, thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play and control over one's environment (Nussbaum 2000). Nussbaum describes these as 'central human functional capabilities'. Many of the capabilities identified by Nussbaum are by no means simple in a number of respects, for example in assessing whether they have been achieved or designing policies aimed at achieving them. Clearly, the underlying or corresponding definition of development is far more

complex than those outlined above. This is also evident from an examination of the equivalent lists provided by other writers, often described as dimensions of development, and numerous extensions of Sen's capability approach. Alkire (2002) provides an excellent and comprehensive survey of human development dimensions and of the research that has identified them. Oosterlaken and van den Hoven (2012), Scheffran and Remling (2013), Trani et al. (2011) and Elson et al. (2011) extend the capability approach to technology and design, human security, disability and human rights, respectively.

The work of Alkire (2002) and others, including Sen's contributions, belongs to the literature on what is now widely called *human well-being*. The capabilities that are identified in it are often called well-being dimensions, and this term will be used in the remainder of this chapter. Broadly analogous terms include the quality of life, the standard of living and, as the UNDP prefers, human development. It is now very common to equate development with these terms. Using the first, development is therefore seen as enhancing or increasing the level of achieved human well-being. This can be at the level of nations, in which it is the overall level of well-being of its citizens, or at the level of individuals.

A key characteristic of the Sen capability approach and its extension by Nussbaum, and indeed the basic human needs approach and the writings of Seers, is that development is seen to be *multidimensional*. It is just not about improvements according to a single criterion, but multiple criteria. The extent to which this had become appreciated in the early 1990s and onwards is evident in statements emanating from the World Bank. The World Bank had long (and sometimes unfairly) been seen as a vanguard of a market-friendly, economic growth-first approach to development strategy. It differentiated between what is referred to as 'economic development' and 'development in a broader sense' in its *World Development Report 1991* (World Bank 1991a). Economic development was seen as a 'sustainable increase in living standards that encompasses material consumption, education, health and environmental protection' (World Bank 1991a: 31). Development in the broader sense was articulated by the World Bank as follows:

Development in a broader sense is understood to include other important and related attributes as well, notably more equality of opportunity, and political and civil liberties. The overall goal of development is therefore to increase the economic, political, and civil rights of all people across gender, ethnic groups, religions, races, regions and countries. (World Bank 1991a: 31)

The pendulum had firmly swung, it seems.

The World Bank, in these quotes, refers to the various population sub-groups (delineated by gender, ethnicity and so on), sustainability and the environment. These issues have for a number of years been highly relevant to development theory and the definition of development. Let's deal with each in turn.

Inequality of incomes among people within countries was discussed above. This type of inequality is often referred to as 'vertical inequality' in that it refers to differences in incomes between individuals. *Horizontal inequality* refers to the existence of inequalities between groups of individuals, typically within countries. It is based on the twin recognitions that an intrinsic part of human life is group membership and that there is a universal human need to belong, to identify with a particular group or groups (Gellner 1964; Stewart 2001). Early usage of the term looked at inequality between culturally defined groups (Stewart 2001), but the same general notion can be applied to gender. Inequities between the sexes, members of different castes and between tribal, racial, religious or ethnic groups are considered to be different types of horizontal inequalities. As Stewart (2001) emphasizes, horizontal inequality is also multidimensional, not only relating to differences in economic outcomes (such as incomes) but to social and political outcomes as well.

Concerns for horizontal inequality were heightened in the 1990s for two main reasons. The first was the increasingly apparent inequities between population sub-groups. It is not uncommon for a man to be twice as likely as a woman to be literate in developing countries (UNDP 2006). One of the best-known cases of inequities among racial groups within countries is South Africa in the apartheid era, which ended in 1993. Some simple statistics bear this out. The average monthly salary of black workers was less than one-third of that of white workers in 1990. In 1980 the incidence of infant mortality (the number of infants dying before their first birthday) in the black community was six times that in the white community. There are of course many other examples from developing countries. These include differences between the living standards of or the rights enjoyed by the various Hindu castes in India, between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, between indigenous and Indian-origin citizens in Fiji, between citizens of Albanian and non-Albanian origin in the Kosovo territory of the former Yugoslavia and between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda. But horizontal inequities, like vertical ones, are clearly not the exclusive domain of developing countries. They can be observed in the developed group as well. Differences in the lives experienced by blacks and whites in the United States, Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland and between indigenous and non-indigenous groups in Australia are examples. Indeed, the

Australian example is among the more extreme in developed countries. Based on mortality rates at the time, in 2000 an indigenous Australian male could be expected to live 54 years, 24 years less than a non-indigenous Australia male. The second factor leading to a heightening of concerns for horizontal inequality related to its perceived consequences, particularly violent conflict. Such inequalities were thought to drive to varying degrees the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia, a series of coups in Fiji and the Rwandan genocide that resulted in an estimated 800,000 deaths.

Concerns over environmental degradation, the use of non-renewable resources and the like are well documented and there is little need to elaborate on them for our current purposes. They are accepted and known and are widely regarded as core issues of our time, affecting all citizens, albeit to varying degrees, worldwide. The more pertinent line of enquiry is to establish how these concerns relate to how development might be defined. At a simple level one might argue that they lead us to question whether it is possible to *sustain* development levels into the future. But this is an explanation of future development levels which treats sustainability as a determinant of them. It does not embed or incorporate sustainability into a definition of development. Put differently, it does not treat sustainability as being constituent of development itself. Anand and Sen (2000) provide the grounds with which one can incorporate sustainability into a definition of development. Earlier in this chapter, a view was put that change cannot be considered as development unless it is equitable. Anand and Sen argue that sustainability should be seen as a concern of inter-generational equity, or as they put it, 'a particular reflection of universality of claims – applied to the future generations vis-à-vis us' (Anand and Sen 2000: 2030). Anand and Sen further note that:

We cannot abuse and plunder our common stock of natural assets and resources leaving the future generations unable to enjoy the opportunities we take for granted today. We cannot use up, or contaminate, our environment as we wish, violating the rights of and the interests of the future generations. (Anand and Sen 2000: 2030)

Sustainability can reasonably easily be seen as development, in this context.

Sustainability has been at the forefront of development policy challenges for years, and now arguably the biggest issues in development. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted by the international community at the United Nations Sustainable Development

Summit in September 2015. They reiterate and extend the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were adopted by the international community at the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000. There were eight MDGs, with most to be achieved by 2015. The principal goal was MDG1, which was to halve the proportion of people living in extreme income poverty from 1990 to 2015. There was one overtly environmental goal, MDG7, which was to ensure environmental sustainability through inter alia providing sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation facilities (United Nations 2015a). There are 17 SDGs, of which at least 13 focus either solely or in part on sustainability issues. They are to be achieved by 2030. SDG15, for example, aims to protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss (United Nations 2015b).

Some comments on development as good-change definitions are warranted at this stage. It is abundantly clear that these definitions, and the interpretations or judgements that emerge from them, are far more complex than corresponding definitions implicit in modernization theories. A country according to this definition could be said to be developing if it was achieving economic or income growth per head of population. The larger or faster this growth, the more it could be said to be developing. Moreover, a country with a higher level of income per head of population than another was said to be more developed. And, as we have seen, certain levels or thresholds of income per capita have been used to distinguish developed from developing countries.

For a number of reasons, such judgements cannot be as easily made if the good-change definitions are used. Let us highlight two. The first is that many of the dimensions that have been identified do not lead to precise judgements regarding changes over time, or across people or countries. Put differently, it is far from self-evident that progress in them might have been achieved or what the levels of fulfilment or achievement might be. The second, and arguably more fundamental, reason relates to the multidimensionality of these definitions or the conceptualizations on which they are based. Seers pointed to this issue when posing the three questions outlined above. To illustrate, consider a situation in which a country is showing improvements in three of five key well-being dimensions, but is showing the reverse in the remaining two by the same magnitude. Is that country developing? Similarly, consider a situation in which we are asked to assess which of two countries has the highest level of development based on these five well-being dimensions. These two countries have identical achievements in

the first three dimensions. But the first country has higher achievement in the fourth dimension and lower achievement, by the same magnitude, than the second country in the fifth dimension. Which country has the highest level of development? The answer to both these questions depends on the relative importance one attaches to the five dimensions. Returning to the first question, if we thought the remaining two dimensions were collectively more important than the first three, we would conclude that the country is not developing. Alternatively, if we thought that the first three dimensions were more important than the last two, we would conclude it was developing. For the second question, we would conclude that the second country was more developed than the first if we thought the fourth dimension was more important than the fifth and vice versa.

The issue of how to weight or assign relative degrees of importance to well-being or quality of life outcomes is a huge issue in the assessment of development levels and trends. In an ideal world, we would have the scientific information to be able to weight these outcomes. But we do not. We do not, for example, have the results of a worldwide survey in which people were asked to rank what outcomes are most important to them. Nor is there consensus on what determines well-being outcomes. This was an issue that the UNDP grappled with in the construction of the HDI. It is widely accepted that the weights attached to the component variables of the HDI should vary. Yet in the absence of information on how to assign values to these weights, the UNDP opted for the simplest alternative which was to give each an equal weighting. This means, for instance, that an improvement in health is just as important as an improvement in education or income of the same magnitude in assessing development changes based on the HDI. At this point it is instructive to recall Sen's view on identifying a set of capabilities, which was that this rests on a value judgement that needs to be explicitly made. The same point can be made about valuing development outcomes. In the absence of the required scientific information, one must ultimately make an explicit value judgement in assigning different values or weights to given outcomes on the basis of personal preferences, subjective or otherwise.

Applying development definitions

It is now appropriate to apply some of the development conceptualizations outlined in this chapter by looking at country classifications and development achievements. Specifically, we look at development

achievements in terms of the modernization-led growth and good-change definitions. The former definition leads us to focus on income levels (as they reflect historical growth rates) and the latter leads us to look at achievements in such areas as health and education. This in many respects is an unavoidably empirical exercise. As such it is necessary to again invoke the caveat stated above, that statistics, while useful, do not adequately capture the plight of the poor. This does not mean that we ignore statistics, just that we recognize their limitations. We start by looking at how countries are classified.

Country classifications

For much of the second half of the twentieth century countries were classified as either First World, Second World or Third World. The First World countries were those that had industrialized and achieved high per capita incomes and belonged to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Second World countries were those that were part of the Soviet bloc and the Third World were in essence, all other countries. The First World countries were considered developed, so too typically were the Second World countries. The Third World countries were considered developing or less developed. While these classifications were influenced by political criteria, it was for much of the second half of the twentieth century that the First World countries were richer in terms of per capita income than those of the Second World, and the Third World countries were poorer still. So, to this extent, the division between developed and developing countries was consistent with the growth via modernization definition of development.

The usage of the terms First World, Second World and Third World came under increasing question in the late 1980s and 1990s. This was for two main reasons. The first is that many of the Third World countries were as rich as those in the First World group and richer than all in the Second World group. Indeed, there was so much diversity in the Third World group that people began to question the usefulness and usage of the term. The second reason was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many of the countries that emerged from the Soviet Union as independent states were extremely poor and by income standards alone could clearly be labelled as developing. These classifications are still largely used today in official circles despite these changes. While the First World, Second World and Third World terms are not used, those that would have been labelled Third World are officially classified by the United Nations and other official international organizations

as 'developing countries': 150 countries or territories were classified as developing in 2010. Most of the former Soviet bloc countries in this year were classified as Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) countries (UNDP 2010a). Full lists of the countries belonging to these and all classifications mentioned in the remainder of this chapter can be found in the *Human Development Report 2010* (UNDP 2010a) and on the World Bank website: www.worldbank.org.

A number of changes in country classifications have occurred over time. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are all former Soviet bloc countries that are now part of the OECD and as such are generally considered as developed countries. The Republic of Korea (South Korea, as it is more widely known), Mexico and Turkey have in the last decade moved from the developing to the OECD group. Many anomalies remain, however, and for this reason the developing countries group remains highly diverse. Many countries in the developing group should clearly be treated as developed. Singapore and Hong Kong have very high well-being or living-standards levels by international standards (Hong Kong has been in the top 20 countries in the world in terms of income per capita) and yet are still in the developing countries group in 2014. The reasons for this are largely political, as certain benefits in terms of access to concessional international finance and trade opportunities, for instance, accrue to countries in the developing group. In partial recognition of the diversity of the developing country group, the United Nations has for many years assembled a 'least developed country' group, based purely on developmental criteria, including income per capita. Countries in this group are those considered by the UN to have the lowest levels of development, as its name implies.

Two additional methods of classifying countries and the corresponding country groups are widely used. The first is to classify countries according to per capita income levels. This is how the World Bank arrives at its income group classifications. As mentioned, it has been common to treat low- and middle-income countries as developing or less developed and high-income as developed countries. The income thresholds used change over time, getting larger each year. In 2014, 75 countries were classified as high income, 105 as middle income and 34 as low income (World Bank 2014d). Singapore and Hong Kong are in the high-income group and yet as mentioned are still included in the UN developing countries group. The number of countries in the low-income group has declined over time owing to per capita economic growth and the resultant graduation of countries into a higher income group. In

2007, for example, 59 countries were classified as low income (World Bank 2007). The second method of classification is based on the HDI, with countries being divided into low, medium and high and very high human development categories. As such, these groupings are consistent with a multidimensional development conceptualization that is broadly consistent with the Sen capability approach, albeit taking into account a rather narrow selection of capabilities. In 2014, 49 countries are classified as very high, 53 as high, 42 as medium and 43 as low human development. Sub-Saharan African countries dominate the low human development group: of the 43 countries in this group, 35 are from this part of the world (UNDP 2014).

Development profiles

Let us now take a closer look at development levels by looking at the development profiles of individual countries and not just the group to which they belong. Which countries have the highest levels of development and which have the lowest? It would be particularly insightful to base this exercise on a comprehensive range of well-being dimensions (or capabilities) but the availability of information required to do this limits us to only relatively basic dimensions. Table 1.1 helps in this regard. It identifies the 20 most developed and 20 least developed countries based on both the HDI and income per capita. Income per capita is measured using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GNI per capita. Such a measure is adjusted to take into account differences in price levels between countries, and as such gives a better idea of the purchasing power of incomes across countries and hence in material living standards. For instance, if one country had a PPP GNI per capita that is twice that of another, a person earning that income in the first country can buy approximately twice the number of equivalent goods and services of someone earning half that income in the second country.

All of those in the top 20 HDI group are classified as high-income countries. The vast majority of countries in the top 20 HDI group are European. The top 20 income per capita countries is much more diverse geographically, but has high representation from countries that rely heavily on oil for their national prosperity. These countries are the Middle Eastern countries of Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, together with Brunei Darussalam and Norway. Both bottom 20 groups are dominated by sub-Saharan African countries. All 20 bottom HDI countries with the exception of Haiti and Afghanistan are from that region. The only bottom 20 income per capita country not

Table 1.1 *Top and bottom 20 countries, 2014*

Human Development Index (HDI)		Income per capita			
Top 20					
Rank	Country	HDI	Rank	Country	GNI per capita (\$PPP)
1	Norway	0.944	1	Qatar	133,713
2	Australia	0.933	2	Luxemburg	86,587
3	Switzerland	0.917	3	Kuwait	84,188
4	Netherlands	0.915	4	Singapore	71,475
5	United States	0.914	5	Brunei Darussalam	71,080
6	Germany	0.911	6	Norway	62,858
7	New Zealand	0.910	7	United Arab Emirates	57,045
8	Canada	0.902	8	Switzerland	51,293
9	Singapore	0.901	9	United States	50,859
10	Denmark	0.900	10	Saudi Arabia	50,791
11	Ireland	0.899	11	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	50,291
12	Sweden	0.898	12	Austria	43,139
13	Iceland	0.895	13	Ireland	42,919
14	United Kingdom	0.892	14	Netherlands	42,453
15	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0.891	15	Australia	42,278
15	Korea (Republic of)	0.891	16	Germany	41,966
17	Japan	0.890	17	Sweden	41,840
18	Liechtenstein	0.889	18	Denmark	41,524
19	Israel	0.888	19	Bahrain	40,658
20	France	0.884	20	Canada	40,588

from sub-Saharan Africa is Haiti. Note also that there is a lot of overlap between the groups: most in the top 20 HDI group are in the top 20 income per capita group and the same applies to the bottom 20 groups. Recalling that the HDI includes measures of health and education, this reflects the statistical reality that, in general, countries with higher levels of these variables also have higher incomes.

The development record

Let us conclude our empirical exercise by looking at the development record over recent decades. Has the level of development, worldwide, increased, decreased or remained the same? We again base this exercise on rather basic well-being dimensions, relating to health, education, income and sustainability. The answer to the preceding question is

Table 1.1 (continued)

Human Development Index (HDI)		Income per capita			
Bottom 20					
Rank	Country	HDI	Rank	Country	GNI per capita (\$PPP)
168	Haiti	0.471	168	Mali	1,607
169	Afghanistan	0.468	169	Sierra Leone	1,586
170	Djibouti	0.467	170	Haiti	1,575
171	Cote d'Ivoire	0.452	171	Gambia	1,565
172	Gambia	0.441	172	Burkina Faso	1,528
173	Ethiopia	0.435	173	Comoros	1,493
174	Malawi	0.414	174	Rwanda	1,379
175	Liberia	0.412	175	Madagascar	1,378
176	Mali	0.397	176	Zimbabwe	1,337
177	Guinea-Bissau	0.396	177	Uganda	1,334
178	Mozambique	0.393	178	Togo	1,286
179	Guinea	0.392	179	Eritrea	1,180
180	Burundi	0.389	180	Guinea-Bissau	1,164
181	Burkina Faso	0.388	181	Mozambique	971
182	Eritrea	0.381	182	Central African Rep.	964
183	Sierra Leone	0.374	183	Niger	884
184	Chad	0.372	184	Liberia	782
185	Central African Rep.	0.341	185	Malawi	739
186	Congo, Dem Rep	0.338	186	Burundi	737
187	Niger	0.337	187	Congo, Dem Rep.	451

Source: Data from UNDP (2014).

not at all straightforward. 'It depends' is probably the way to respond. The development balance sheet, shown in Table 1.2, helps illustrate this point. It distinguishes between what might be called good change, progress or development from less pleasing changes. The former are labelled alternatively as deprivation, disparity or, consistent with the development as domination and exploitation paradigm, underdevelopment. If we look at the development record over the last 45 to 50 years, we cannot help but be impressed by the substantial progress that has been made in many areas. The left-hand side of the balance sheet in Table 1.2 makes this abundantly clear. People are now living much longer, many less children are dying before reaching their fifth birthday, far more people are literate, incomes have increased tremendously and consciousness of environmental and sustainability issues has increased substantially in recent years. To these extents, the development record

Table 1.2 *A development balance sheet*

<i>Progress, good change, development</i>	<i>Deprivation, disparity, underdevelopment</i>
<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The life expectancy of a person born in a developing country in 1961 was 47 years. By 2012 this number had risen to 69 years. Worldwide, average life expectancy increased from 52 to 71 years over the same period. The number of children in the world dying before their fifth birthday fell by 134 deaths per 1000 children between 1961 and 2013. In developing countries it fell from 218 to 50 deaths per 1000 children over the same period. <p>Education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The percentage of developing country adults who were literate rose from 64 in 1970 to 80 in 2010. In the least developed countries it more than doubled between 1970 and 2010, from 26 to 59 per cent. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A person born in a high-income OECD country in 2012 is expected to live 26, 21 or 13 years longer than one born in the same year in sub-Saharan Africa, a least developed or a developing country, respectively. In many OECD countries life expectancy had exceeded 80 years of age in 2012. Life expectancy in 2012 was 46 years in Sierra Leone and 49 years in Lesotho. In 2013 6.3 million children still died before their fifth birthday. Roughly half these deaths occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. A child born in a least developed country in 2013 is 19 times more likely to die before reaching its fifth birthday than one born in the same year a high-income OECD country. A child born in sub-Saharan Africa in 2013 is 20 times more likely to die before its fifth birthday than one born in the same year in the European Union. One billion adults were illiterate in the world in 2013. In many developing countries more than half of all adult females and in 10 sub-Saharan African countries more than seven out of every 10 females were illiterate in 2013. It is not uncommon in developing countries for a male to be almost twice as likely as a female to receive a secondary school education.

Table 1.2 (continued)

<i>Progress, good change, development</i>	<i>Deprivation, disparity, underdevelopment</i>
<p>Income and wealth</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing country per capita income (measured using GDP per capita in 2005 prices) increased more than fourfold between 1961 and 2013, from US\$575 to US\$2,479. World per capita income increased over the same period from US\$3,134 to US\$7,850. <p>Environment and sustainability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Environmental consciousness has increased worldwide in recent decades and most countries have ratified the major international environmental treaties, including the Kyoto Protocol. Official national targets to limit greenhouse gas emissions are not commonplace and the concept of 'green growth' is widely accepted. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> More than one billion people – one-fifth of the world's population – live in conditions of extreme income poverty, surviving on less than \$1.25 per day. In at least 12 developing countries more than half the population lives in extreme income poverty. Income per capita (measured using GNI per capita adjusted for purchasing power) among OECD high-income countries in 2013 was 5, 13 and 21 times that in developing, sub-Saharan African and least developed countries, respectively. These gaps have increased over time. Qatar's purchasing power parity GNI per capita in 2013 was an incredible 296 times that of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2013 the richest 10 per cent of the world's population held 86 per cent of world income, while the poorest 50 per cent held 1 per cent. In 2013 1 per cent of the world's adult population held more than 46 per cent of the world's personal assets. World carbon dioxide emissions rose from 3.1 metric tons per person in 1961 to 4.9 metric tons per person in 2012. In OECD high-income countries they rose from 7.9 to 11.3 metric tons per person over the same period. The world's largest carbon dioxide emitting country over the decade from 1998 – which contributed more than one fifth of total world carbon dioxide emissions during these years – still refuses to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.

Source: Data from various issues of the UNDP *Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP) and the World Bank *World Development Indicators* (Washington DC: World Bank), the UNICEF *Levels and Trends in Child Mortality 2014 Report* (New York: Unicef) and from the Credit Suisse *Global Wealth Report 2013* (Zurich: Credit Suisse).

is impressive, levels of development are higher than ever before (at least in recorded history) and the world is a better place as a consequence.

But it must be emphasized that this picture is an average or aggregate one. It does not necessarily apply to all people in all countries of the world and ignores a number of disparities. It is, in short, a partial story as the right-hand side of the balance sheet reveals. Despite improvements in child mortality and literacy, 6.3 million children died in 2013 before reaching their fifth birthday, one billion adults are illiterate and one billion people live in extreme income poverty, on less than \$PPP.125 per day. Disparities have also grown, quite substantially in some cases. Finally, the increase in environmental awareness notwithstanding, carbon dioxide emissions are still on the rise worldwide and some countries have not ratified key international environmental agreements.

The main conclusion emerging from Table 1.2 is that despite the progress that has been made, the world remains a place of widespread deprivation. Much more still needs to be done, and the world could be a much better place.

So, let us ask our question again. Has the level of development, worldwide, increased, decreased or remained the same over recent decades? If one looks at the general picture and ignores disparities, then on balance the answer to this question based on the evidence just presented is probably 'yes'. It might differ, of course, if one looked at information based on a large range of well-being or related dimensions. But if our conceptualization of development includes a concern for equity, the answer is not so clear. Recall what Seers wrote about development: that if unemployment, poverty or inequality has grown worse, it would be strange to call the result development. Inequality seems to have grown worse. Has there then been development? To emphasize a point made above, the answer will depend on how highly we value equality. If it has an especially high value, then we might conclude that the level of development in the world has declined, and not risen as many would assert.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined various meanings or conceptualizations of development. It commenced by looking at traditional conceptualizations. This included the definition implicit in the modernization approach to development, which saw development largely as economic growth. The chapter then examined more contemporary meanings of development

those which emerged from the late 1960s to the present. These meanings are those which either relate to the domination and exploitation of one group by another or to what might very loosely be described as 'good change'. Most attention was devoted to the latter; this was on the grounds that these definitions are particularly useful because they force us to focus on and consider what sort of change or outcomes we want to see in all countries, rich and poor, providing a framework to compare actual changes against those we would like to observe. The fundamental premise of the chapter is that defining development, and deciding what is development and what is not, or whether development has actually occurred, is a necessarily subjective exercise. It is also a rather complicated exercise, requiring one to reflect on one's own personal values to judge what is most important and what is not as important.

Given this, let us conclude with some more questions, in addition to those asked in the previous section of this chapter. What is your definition of development? Is it based on multiple dimensions or on a single dimension? Put differently, what criteria does a country need to satisfy to be considered to have achieved higher levels of development? It might be useful to write down your own definition (ideally limiting it to a sentence) and revisit it from time to time as you work your way through this book, and especially when you have completed reading it.

unnecessarily, hunger is constant and basic needs go unmet. Those experiencing poverty lack freedom to determine their own lives and once in poverty it is often difficult for them to escape. If poverty is to end, it will require co-operation and goodwill at the international, national and local level. The international community has pledged to reduce poverty by half before 2015. Indeed, all regions have made improvements, though the driving force behind the significant reduction in global poverty levels is largely through the achievements in China and India. Sufficient resources exist at the international level to end poverty if wealthy countries meet their commitments of providing just under 1 per cent of their GNP in overseas aid.

Interventions to end poverty rely on understanding the experience of poverty. It must be defined and measured before appropriate interventions can be planned and implemented. It is precisely poverty's overwhelming nature that requires every effort to be made in order to eradicate it.

Chapter 8

Community Development

Damien Kingsbury

Development is intended to improve the lives of people so there is, then, a strong and logical case for development starting with people. Community development focuses on development projects as they directly relate to and include the participation of local, usually rural or small urban, communities. In particular, it addresses issues that are of immediate concern to those communities that are intended to have the capacity to produce continuing localized results. It also reflects the notion that development, broadly conceived, is about the enhancement of the potential of people to emancipate themselves (see Sen 1999a). That is, it is intended to give them greater capacity to exercise control over their own lives (see Tesoriero 2010: 65). This is usually referred to as 'empowerment'.

This 'empowerment' approach to development 'places the emphasis on autonomy in the decision-making of territorially organized communities, local self-reliance, direct and inclusive (participatory) democracy, and experiential social learning' (Friedman 1992: vii). However, like many other good ideas that have been encapsulated in a single word or phrase, 'empowerment' has been used so widely and by so many people and organizations for so many different purposes that it has started to lose meaning: '[I]n some countries, governments talk glibly of empowerment of the poor in their development plans, having stripped the term of any real meaning' (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 118).

As will be discussed in this chapter, one cannot 'empower' another; 'empowerment' must come from within. This chapter addresses some of the main issues in community development, looking at both the strengths and weaknesses of attempts to assist communities to empower themselves. The experience of community development has in many cases been positive but, as with the rest of the development process, it has not been immune to problems.

Like all ideas about development, what community development, or empowerment, means is contested, reflecting the range of interests that come into play when theory meets practice. There are two primary foci

for community development, the first being encapsulated in the idea that it is about development of and for the 'community', or what has been referred to as 'community driven development' (CDD) (see World Bank 2014a), and the second is about development via community decision-making processes or participation (e.g. see Nelson and Wright 1995). The 'community', in this instance, is usually defined as the local group or otherwise small groups of people, usually living in relative isolation, that are characterized by face-to-face relationships. In this, the 'community' size is determined by the needs of co-operation and either consensus or an agreed regulated process of decision-making. On this basis, the size of a viable community can vary from place to place, and is not able to be universally determined (Hodge 1970: 68). As a consequence, community development programmes must involve a capacity for modification according to local circumstances, according to locally determined criteria of what constitutes the community, and to suit local needs. What should be noted is that 'internal' approaches to community development reflect a fundamental reorientation of development towards a grass-roots or localized process and outcomes, usually implying local participation in the process.

Community participation serves immediate instrumental goals such as the identification of felt needs as well as the mobilization of local resources. But it also promotes broader social development ideals: by participating fully in decision-making for social development, ordinary people experience fulfilment which contributes to a heightened sense of community and a strengthening of community bonds. (Midgley 1986: 9)

This is in contrast to external, macro-level or infrastructure development projects that only indirectly affect people at the local level, and in which local communities have very little, if any, say, usually little or no participation, and almost always no control.

Bottom-up versus top-down

Community development processes have been shown, in a number of cases, to produce real, tangible and appropriate benefits for local people, as well as providing a greater sense of self-worth and empowerment. Such forms of development also work within and help preserve aspects of local culture that give meaning to community life and which assist in maintaining and enhancing the social cohesion that is necessary when engaging in a process of change.

While large-scale and state-originated development projects can address macroeconomic or infrastructure requirements that can determine the parameters for more localized development, it is common for such 'top-down' projects and decision-making to fail to deliver tangible benefits to many people, including the most marginalized. Many large-scale projects not only fail but are not designed to meet the needs and preferences of people at the local level, are often not based on local experience and are frequently unsustainable once the aid provider has left. State-run projects may similarly have a focus which is not intended for the communities most directly affected. The adoption of 'bottom-up' or 'flat' local decision-making structures is thus seen as more responsive in addressing local needs. According to the World Bank:

[E]conomic growth is necessary but by no means sufficient to achieve widespread poverty reduction in the world. The [World Development] Report [on Poverty] lists three essential pillars – opportunity, security, and empowerment – to achieve a significant rate of sustained poverty reduction amongst the poorest population groups. By the same token, the recently released book on *The Quality of Growth*, published by the World Bank Institute, also clearly demonstrates the shift from a predominantly 'economic growth' development model to an approach in which the development of human and socio-cultural capital is deemed a sine qua non for achievement of balanced and sustainable development ... [I]n countries with a relatively low level of inequality and a medium level of economic growth, the chances for large-scale poverty reduction are considerably greater than in countries with high economic growth and high levels of income inequality. (World Bank 2001a; see also World Bank 2002a)

While local empowerment is important, not all decisions taken at a local level are appropriate. Some decisions are based in a sense of desperation and are, hence, very short-term or immediately focused, with little or no focus on longer-term sustainability. Other decisions can be based on a limited understanding of opportunities or of the consequence of such decisions, for example, taking out small loans which meet immediate needs but create longer-term debt problems. In yet other circumstances, traditional or recently established elites who retain power or influence in local settings take or limit decisions, often in their own interests or, again, with a limited understanding of options or outcomes. Within many traditional societies, hierarchical power structures often removed from ordinary people not just the power to make larger decisions about their collective lives but constructed a social psychology

of deference towards power-holders. The issue of social power is a complex one and can be inconsistent across political and cultural contexts, despite what might otherwise be seen as commonalities of interest in particular strata of society and very often the common material conditions applying to particular circumstances. As Weitz notes: 'when involving entire communities in development, the social planner must be capable of using existing social relations advantageously'. That is, a failure to recognize and sensitively employ traditional leaders and others can lead to development project failure (Weitz 1986: 167; see also Warren 1993).

However, CDD is intended to overcome many of these and other shortcomings, by developing and enhancing local empowerment, participatory governance, demand responsiveness, administrative autonomy, greater downward accountability and enhanced local capacity.

Experience has shown that when given clear explanations of the process, access to information and appropriate capacity and financial support, poor men and women can effectively organize to identify community priorities and address local problems by working in partnership with local governments and other supportive institutions. (World Bank 2014a)

External involvement

Assuming that local decision-making is most likely to produce results sensitive to local needs and desires, such decision-making may still require assistance, advice or information available primarily from external sources, e.g. the state or multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. However, outside aid providers can (sometimes unwittingly) shape local agendas or inappropriately insert themselves into local decision-making processes in ways that may not be sustainable and that may destabilize local social relations. The role of the development worker is thus among the most difficult issues in community development, especially when it is focused on empowerment. In simple terms, while a situation might require the intervention of an external agent to facilitate circumstances that allow change, that external intervention by definition must, at some stage, precede empowerment, and may displace it. Based on the assumption that if communities could change themselves they would have done so, though it is desirable it is a rare and extraordinarily sensitive community development project that is able to allow local people to lead.

In all discussion about community development, it must be noted that external factors, from the environment to government to broad material and economic conditions, will have a constraining influence on what is or is not achievable within a local context. According to Friedman: 'local action is severely constrained by global economic forces, structures of unequal wealth, and hostile class alliances' (1992: xii). If development is to look to communities as the source of change, they must also seek to transform social power into political power and engage in national and international issues (Friedman 1992: xii).

Yet, as noted, in helping to create an environment in which people can make decisions for themselves, decisions are often made for them. The first decision is whether or not the community in question wishes for such intervention in their lives. Further interventions tend to flow from that, including decisions about what aspects of community development are or should be available, what the priorities for community development are, the nature of local social and hierarchical relations and decision-making, and so on. This is especially the case if there is an explicit assumption on the part of development planners that there should be co-ordination between local and wider development goals (Weitz 1986: 79), which is common to much development planning. This is despite acknowledging the necessity of recognizing the 'needs, beliefs and abilities of traditional peoples' (Weitz 1986: 78). However, as Freire (1985) noted: 'Attempting to liberate the oppressed without their reflective participation in the act of liberation is to treat them as objects which must be saved from a burning building, it is to lead them into the populist pitfall and transform them into masses which can be manipulated.'

In this, Freire implicitly opposed such populist manipulation and made it his project to assist with the creation of conditions that would allow people to 'liberate' themselves. Korten also notes that it is not really possible for one person to 'empower' another. People can only empower themselves (1989: 118-19).

Oliver recognized the potential conflict between the ideas of development planners and local people when he noted that it should be 'the first task of a voluntary organization ... to encourage the people to speak up when aid projects go wrong' (Oliver 1983: 137). Weitz similarly noted that there needed to be an active 'feedback relationship' to allow constant revision of local development projects to fully take into account field realities (Weitz 1986: 174). In this, Weitz and Oliver were primarily referring to covering up aid programmes that were failing or that had failed in order to save official embarrassment, but still allowing for such failure to be repeated. Similarly, Jain, Krishnamurthy and

Tripathi suggest that 'the basic reason for the failure of rural development and poverty alleviation programmes is the exclusion of the people from participation in the development process and the abandonment of the institutions of democratic decentralization and the related electoral process' (Jain, Krishnamurthy and Tripathi 1985: 15). Democratic decentralization, in this context, means 'recognizing multiple centres of power' (sometimes referred to as 'Public Interest Partnerships'), which assist in ensuring accountability, transparency, participation, equity, predictability and efficiency. In this sense, what is broadly referred to as governance becomes essential, reflecting the authenticity of local electoral democracy. In simple terms, 'good governance is good for development' (Gonzalez, Lauder and Melles 2000: 165).

However, the principle of appropriate development programmes and the necessity for vocal local input remains valid. Weitz (1986: 174) similarly noted that there needed to be a bottom-up 'feedback relationship' to allow constant revision so that programmes could conform to local realities.

Background to community development

Ideas about community development were first commonly propagated in the early 1970s, following what was widely seen as the failure of the 'decade of development' of the 1960s in which decolonization did not automatically result in development and in which explicitly modernist or industrial policies were mistakenly regarded as the universal path to 'take-off'. What occurred instead, in many developing countries, was a mixture of semi-development, development experiencing losses and then gains in succession, or just simple underdevelopment, in which a number of countries increasingly went backwards. The overall result, at a time when the West remained optimistic, was an overall decline in developing countries and especially amongst the majority poor of developing countries. As Mortimer noted, this was in large part due to the blind faith held by Western planners in the value of modernization and, consequently, in the lack of value accorded to 'peasants' (Mortimer 1984: ch. 3).

In response to continuing and increasing poverty in developing countries, then later as president of the World Bank, Robert McNamara outlined the basic needs, or 'redistribution with growth' approach to development, which focused development on local initiatives. McNamara's then groundbreaking view was that poverty alleviation for the world's poorest 40 per cent was of primary importance, although this should not be undertaken in ways that would damage prospects

for economic growth (UNICEF 1996: ch. 3). In this, McNamara was influenced by the 'peripheral' work of NGOs, and thinking such as that expounded by British economist E. F. Schumacher in his seminal work *Small Is Beautiful*, which turned away from large-scale industrialization and macroeconomics towards more appropriate medium levels of technology and local economics.

Yet, while this shift in focus was important, the origins of community development can be traced to some of the first thinking about development as a part of the process of decolonization, pre-dating the optimistic and sometimes grandiose ideas of the 1960s. The original United Nations position on community development, for instance, was that it 'is a technique for improving the levels of living, particularly in underdeveloped areas, community development being interpreted as a process creating conditions of economic and social progress for the whole community with its active participation and the fullest possible reliance upon the community's initiative' (UN 1958: 21).

Participatory democracy

One of the major criticisms of democratic processes has been that, through increasingly centralized representative processes, it has become too distant from the people being represented. Participatory democracy implies the greater direct participation of political constituents in political decision-making processes. Most common methods of participatory democracy are direct democracy, in which constituents vote directly on matters that affect them, primarily through local power structures or heavily decentralized political models. The advantage of this approach is the greater access to decision-making processes and potentially greater legitimacy of political outcomes. However, such systems do have limited application in large, complex societies that require broad decision-making affecting large populations. There are also questions around the extent to which voters might be familiar with the detail of all of the subjects they might be required to decide on, as well as the potential for short-term or narrowly focused decisions which could have longer-term or wider negative consequences.

One increasingly popular mechanism developed to address the sense of distance in political decision-making, and which has also been applied in limited ways in non-democratic states such as China and Laos, has been that of 'deliberative democracy', sometimes also referred to as 'discursive democracy'. This model of decision-making combines elements of representative as well as direct democratic processes, with constituent members of a political group (e.g. village, town) discussing political decisions

or laws with representatives and having a consensus view of their deliberations reflected in political action. An alternative to this approach is deliberative polling, in which participants do not meet directly. The deliberative democracy model was initially developed in the 1980s but has since seen widespread theoretical adoption and, in some cases, practical use (e.g. see discussion by He 2010 of its application in China).

The principal benefit of deliberative democracy is intended to be, through being able to trace their origins, as with other participatory forms, an increased sense of legitimacy in political decisions. There is also a sense in which, through widespread consultation, there is a higher degree of impartiality, rationalism and knowledge of relevant facts in decision-making (Bessette 1994). Some negative consequences of this process, however, include the argument that the process inhibits rather than helps rational decision-making, that it is ideologically biased in favour of liberalism and republican models over parliamentary ones, that, like other participatory methods, it can too readily reflect self-interest and that it promotes a division between the state and society (see Blattberg 2003).

Given that decisions on spending usually limited income is key in political processes, participatory budgeting is a key element of participatory democracy. This process usually involves the public identification of spending needs, their prioritization, the public decision-making process and, finally, its implementation via public officials. While this process can have some of the shortcomings of more general participatory decision-making, it does increase equity and the transparency and accountability of financial decision-making. In Porto Alegre, Brazil, since 1989 this process has led to direct improvements in water and sanitation and access to public education (Lewit 2002). Since this beginning, the process has spread elsewhere in Latin America, to Asia, Europe and North America. Despite positive outcomes, the actual rate of participation in the process has been proportionately low, with some 50,000 people in Porto Alegre participating from a population of 1.5 million. Further, some experiences have shown that participation rates decline after initial needs have been met. The process has, however, increased in popularity and provided a real mechanism for addressing needs as understood at the community level.

Education as development

There is widespread agreement within the development community generally and among community development planners in particular that education creates the best conditions for empowerment and community

development. In particular, literacy programmes are widely seen as both an instrumental good, in that they can produce measurable benefits and create opportunities for material improvement in the lives of people, and as a good in themselves, in creating choices for decision-making that might not have previously existed.

Even though the use of education was an early approach to community development, its history dates back even further, being first conceived of by the British Colonial Office in the 1920s, although it was not applied in Africa until the 1940s. Ghana launched its first mass literacy and education campaign in 1951, which was soon after adopted by the nearby French colonies (Manghezi 1976: 41). In this, community development was seen as 'a vehicle for progressive evolution of the peoples to self-government in the context of social and economic change' (Manghezi 1976: 39–40). The idea of community development was not well developed initially, although even at this stage it was recognized that education was a critical component which found translation as the opening of 'development area schools' and similar projects (Manghezi 1976: 41). The movement did, however, find some parallel in Mahatma Gandhi's *swaraj* (self-rule) or stateless community movement, increasingly including passive resistance and non-co-operation, initially developed in South Africa before being imported to India as the basis for the claim to independence. As then, newly post-colonial African states sought to create new development models and the central role of education was given a new lease of life under Tanzania's 'Ujamaa Villages' programme in the 1960s.

The idea of empowerment, in this context, is reflected in the ideas of Paulo Freire (1976, 1985), based on the need to develop people's abilities to understand, question and resist the circumstances that keep them in poverty. Freire promoted not just the idea of the necessity of education as a model for empowerment, but also that the spread of such education should itself be an act of empowerment ('all teach, all learn', understood as Freire's 'dialogic method' 1976: ch. 4), critically engaging with and hence changing the lived experiences of the participants (also see Kincheloe and Horn 2007). In this, education generally, and literacy in particular, are seen as critical criteria for individual and group development (see also Rensberg 1980). Freire's critique was essentially derived from a 'bottom-up' perspective of social and economic relations and was predicated upon the idea of reflection (via education) leading to action (praxis) (Freire 1985: ch. 3). Perhaps the biggest difference between Freire's revolutionary pedagogy and the role of education in more contemporary community development is that the latter is based upon a more localized and, hence, contained basis, and that it seeks to allow its recipients to participate in wider economic and political spheres rather than to overthrow them.

Freire's work can, nonetheless, be understood as a basic principle of 'capacity-building', in which local communities not only have opportunities to make decisions but have developed an enhanced capacity to be able to do so. Discussion about capacity-building has been a significant feature of development discourse since the mid-1990s, yet there are few clear definitions about its meaning. One interpretation has capacity-building as equivalent to developing social capital (CVCB 2007), while others have it as the development of practical skills. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), capacity-building is 'the creation of an enabling environment with appropriate policy and legal frameworks, institutional development, including community participation (of women in particular), human resources development and strengthening of managerial systems' (cited in Global Development Research Center, n.d.). Walker, in whose work this definition is also cited, adds that the UNDP 'recognizes that capacity building is a long-term, continuing process, in which all stakeholders participate' (Walker 2007).

Of these attributes at a community level, literacy, as the most fundamental aspect of education, has thus remained a key issue in empowerment and participation of local communities. It remains both an obvious means to individual and local development and feeds in directly to the capacity of the state, via its constituents, to proactively to pursue its own wider development goals. Literacy can also be argued, as noted, to be an end in itself, in terms of enhancing the scope of individuals to participate in a literate world.

In a not dissimilar fashion, literacy has been cited as being useful to individuals as well as for 'development' in Bangladesh (although this nominally assumes the questionable distinction between the welfare of individuals and 'development'). A literacy programme was developed by the Friends in Village Development Bangladesh for landless men and women, which was based on small groups and was combined with organizational support, savings and credit schemes, technical assistance for income generation and the rebuilding of a sense of self-worth. 'Literacy is therefore linked to generating local group structures and capacity-building', not least of which is the capacity to participate in the development process (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 117). It is worth noting here that those developing countries that have performed best, such as the 'newly industrialized countries' of East Asia, invested heavily in education as a precondition for their growth. In particular, the centrality of education to Confucian thinking resulted in massive investment in education in Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, in each case with dramatic results.

While literacy has been identified by most governments of developing countries as a – probably *the* – critical development issue, it has not been free of problems, both internally and externally. One of the internal problems with education campaigns is that they do not necessarily address the educational imbalance that can occur between people with and without power. That is, a person with power who is probably already literate may have their literacy enhanced, while an illiterate person may achieve only a basic level of literacy and, in terms of complex written information, still be at a significant disadvantage (especially if their literacy is tested, for example, via a contract or another complex device).

Significantly, almost one in seven of the world's population remains illiterate – they cannot read or write a simple sentence – with adults representing over 80 per cent of this group. Unsurprisingly, two-thirds of those who are illiterate are women (UNESCO 2013), indicating not just a gender preference in education but the continued structural disadvantage of many women in developing countries.

Literacy is also most useful when combined with other technical support or enhancement. From an external perspective, education campaigns have often been amongst the first to be affected by externally imposed 'structural adjustment' programmes in which government spending is cut to reduce public expenditure and debt. While cutting education spending can be seen as a 'soft' option for governments seeking to reduce expenditure in the face of an unsustainable burden of debt, it is very often recommended by external 'consultants' whose concerns are less for the welfare of ordinary people or, indeed, for enhancing the productive capacity of workers than they are for short-term macroeconomic outcomes. This disregard for the personal and social value of education very often reflects an unstated ideological bias against mass participation that is potentially occasioned by mass education.

Social distinction

Within any given social context of a local community in a developing country, there is likely to be a marked distinction between elites and others. That is, people with political or economic power (or other forms of social capital) will, in most cases, tend to be somewhat set apart from the vast majority who do not enjoy political or economic power, even though they will necessarily interact and may display elements of a type of social contract. In particular, what once might have been a simpler dichotomy has become complicated by shifting patterns of patronage,

land ownership and employment. Traditional elites might operate as a hereditary or quasi-elected village or district head and enjoy certain privileges as a consequence. But there has also emerged a new category of political or administrative elites who owe their appointment to political associations or patronage that may be more connected to larger urban centres and modernist or quasi-modernist political formations such as political parties. Power-holders will almost always attempt, often vigorously, to retain or enhance their social, political and economic power (see Burkey 1988: 165).

Associated with such localized political clients or *apparatchiks* are lesser functionaries who may also obtain some personal benefit by way of political association, perhaps through their or their family members' appointment to jobs, business concessions, protections or favourable treatment – a set of practices known in Indonesia and Timor-Leste, for instance, by the acronym 'KKN' (*Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme*, or Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism). Shopkeepers and other small business owners might also be seen as falling into this category. In a critique on the value of encouraging small enterprise, Fromm and Maccoby noted that 'entrepreneurs do not solve the village's economic problems. They become middlemen, money lenders, and store keepers ... the result is to increase dependency and powerlessness of the landless' (Fromm and Maccoby 1970: 205, see also Chau, Goto and Kanbur 2009). In more traditional societies, such a localized sub-elite might occupy regularized positions within the community hierarchy, such as legal or religious adviser (often the same), or local constabulary or peacekeeper.

In contrast to localized elites and related sub-elites are 'urban masses' (town dwellers), migrant workers, and rural peasantry. Urban masses, or more commonly in a local context, town dwellers, are largely those people who function at the lower end of the cash economy, as employees, small stallholders, as the under-employed (e.g., those hawking minor trinkets, matches or newspapers, or voluntary traffic or parking attendants and so on) or as the unemployed. Town-dwelling unemployed may include victims of economic downturn or other reasons for loss of gainful employment, peasants who have lost their land, single parents (usually mothers), street children (functional orphans), the mentally and physically disabled and others who, for various reasons, have slipped through the usually threadbare social networks that help sustain people in difficult times.

Migrant workers often constitute a separate group of town dwellers, not necessarily being fixed to social networks, living in fringe communities (in both figurative and literal senses) outside local social and

official support structures and not being a part of local decision-making processes. They may be structurally precluded from broad equality of access to material well-being, such as through lesser pay, access to potable water or electricity, education for their children, health care and so on. Migrant workers may also be employed on a seasonal basis, and either be transitory or unemployed during 'off' seasons. As a consequence, migrant workers are excluded from decision-making at a number of levels and there is often resistance to their incorporation into local decision-making processes.

Interactions between the various strata of society, and the subsequent capacity for or interest in power sharing, do find broad commonalities across the development context. But there are also regional differences, usually borne out of local experience over a long period. Illustrations of these differing contexts come from as far apart as Mexico and Indonesia. Within the rural Mexican context, the taking and giving of orders may be unpopular with peasants who are productive and who tend to hoard. Authority or 'leadership' suggests to them exploitative bosses, which has strong negative connotations and is therefore not popular. There is, in this, a lack of interest in forcing compliance on the part of others (Fromm and Maccoby 1970: 209). In such a respect, local organization requiring leadership can be difficult to obtain. In a different cultural context, there is a widespread view that village office should neither be coveted nor too highly rewarded. One consequence of this, though, is that 'villagers might content themselves with mediocre leadership for long periods without concerted attempts at replacement' (Warren 1993: 123).

Notions of authority and hierarchy vary from context to context, and the role of authority in local decision-making and how that is employed is not consistent. In some cases, authority is a capacity not to be trusted or to be used with caution. Warren noted that in Bali, members of the traditional aristocracy, civil servants and agents of political parties who were seen to have status, office or wealth (that is, traditional patrons) had difficulty in presenting their views publicly in what was seen to be a disinterested manner. Hence, orators without such *manjar* (significance), but who have influence based on personal qualities, including knowledge of local *adat* (customary law) and skills in public speaking, are often in as strong or a stronger position to persuade local people of the value of an idea.

As a consequence of this public distinction between formal and informal authority figures, a dual leadership pattern can emerge. However, within this, while the ideals of the group were supposed to predominate, formal or traditional decision-makers still exercise informal influence

on orators. 'Although close association with patrons would compromise an orator's credibility, covert alliances develop and orators are able to use their skills to frame factional interests of powerful patrons in terms of principles acceptable in the public forum.' This presentation of a shadow leadership pattern, allied to formal and informal political arenas and codes of expression, shares certain features with Bloch's proposition (1975: 6, 12) that formalized rules and speech forms are essentially vehicles of traditional authority and established power relations. That is to say, even though this social environment might portray itself as formally egalitarian and moral, it actually remains hierarchical and instrumental (Warren 1993: 73). Deeply ingrained notions of structural hierarchy may thus mean it is difficult to achieve local development projects without the consent or participation of local authority figures, or that their involvement will more likely guarantee the success of a project.

Warren has noted that the Indonesian family planning project, which has been generally regarded as successful, achieved its greatest success on the island of Bali. This has been identified as being a direct consequence of what was called the *Sistem Banjar* (Neighbourhood Association System), in which the village community was a conduit for family planning. By way of illustration of its success, in 1985 Bali had the highest rate for use of contraceptives (74.5 per cent) in Indonesia, compared with the national 52.2 per cent average (Warren 1993: 217; Arifin 2010). This use of contraceptives was directly linked to the highest drop in the fertility rate, which declined by almost half. In order to achieve this level of contraception usage, heads of *banjar* (neighbourhood or hamlet associations) were sent to training seminars and liaised with district family planning field workers to provide information and contraceptives. *Banjar* heads were also responsible for registering eligible couples, compiling statistics on contraceptive use and motivating acceptance in communities (Warren 1993: 218). According to Warren, the *klian* (head) of Banjar Tegah said the contraceptive campaign 'would not ever have succeeded if it hadn't gone through the *banjar*. Before everyone was embarrassed to talk about such matters. Now it is normal. At each assembly meeting we discussed family planning until everyone understood sufficiently' (Warren 1993: 218). This conformed to Weitz's view that, 'when involving entire communities in development, the social planner must be capable of using existing social relations advantageously' (Weitz 1986: 167). However, this also reflected the broad interests, and reinforced the status, of the local elite.

Apart from local elite input, Warren said there was no difference in contraceptive use based on social or economic status, although there

was variance between *banjar* (between 30 and 60 per cent acceptance) which correlated to the distance between *banjar* and the local family planning clinic (Warren 1993: 219) and between support or otherwise of *klian* for the programme (Warren 1993: 220). Proximity to both the source of the programme and the motivator for the programme was critical to the success of a local programme. Warren noted that while local leadership was important, and was influenced by proximity, discussion of leadership or local institutions also needed to take account of Balinese conceptions of the 'popular' which were unquestionably influenced by modern ideas about democracy as well as traditional practices and status orientation (Warren 1993: 123).

Social organization

Even in local projects, in which autonomy is meant to be paramount, there can continue to be a heavy reliance upon external agencies for assistance, in which case the local community provides only part of the total requirement to undertake a local project. One illustration of this, from Indonesia, is where local funding and communal labour (*gotong royong* – mutual help) supplemented a quarter of the cost of a local project established by the Public Works Department. Notably, two weeks' labour was provided by a local military unit under the *Angkatan Masuk Desa* (Army Enters Village) programme for local public works. This programme was developed in the mid-1980s as a means of bringing the army closer to the people, to enhance 'development' more generally but also to cement the military's role in the development process as well as to keep a watchful eye over potential dissidents and leftists.

Yet, even though this was a government-sponsored scheme and the military component was supposed to be paid for out of the military's own budget, the *klian banjar* was still required to make a 'donation' of a monetary 'gift' to the military commander as repayment for the assistance provided (Warren 1993: 225). In such instances, most of the 'gift' of cash would be kept by the local military commander, although a portion of it would be paid to his own superiors in his patron-client network, and a portion would be spent on or distributed to the soldiers who actually undertook the work to support their living conditions or as supplementary wages. In this way, the autonomy of village projects was still compromised by broader state projects, patron-client relations, and notions of hierarchy and authority, the unofficial but socially constructed reciprocal elements which most villagers found impossible to escape.

In relation to Indonesia's primary education campaign, begun in 1973, central government funding via sub-provincial districts allowed villages to sub-contract or manage construction of new schools themselves. This was regarded as:

one of the most beneficial and least controversial development programmes, expanding rural employment while broadening educational opportunities. The effect of Inpres SD (the presidential decree that launched the programme) was to raise primary enrolment across Indonesia to a claimed 85 per cent by 1980 (the World Bank said enrolment was 78 per cent in 1984, indicating a tendency for the government to over-inflate its claims). (Warren 1993: 215)

Because of the benefit to both local education and local employment, under this programme 'villages devoted considerable energy to this task.' A *klian* of one of the *banjar* in *Desa* (Village) Siang said: 'besides giving work here, the buildings are better. Why? Because they are ours. If they call in someone from outside, I wouldn't trust them' (Warren 1993: 215).

Even in what was widely considered to be a successful community development programme, there was still some disquiet with the reliance of the programme on outside sources. In this case it was due to corruption at the next level of government up from the village: 'leaders in Tarian and other *desa* expressed frustration at the substantial loss in real value of materials received for projects when delivery was managed through the *kabupaten*'. In this, some building materials were stolen, while others that had to be purchased through the sub-provincial district administration were overpriced (Warren 1993: 230). The role of the *klian banjar* also retained some capacity for capriciousness in development projects. In another village studied by Warren, which was built over the water of a bay, the village head dominated the use of the fresh water tank and left the other two unused tanks outside his home. Fresh water was supplied, at a high cost, by an enterprising Bugis merchant (Warren 1993: 229). However, despite such problems, and reflecting the balance in favour of meeting development objectives, *banjar* continued to be used to balance local decision-making and central needs and objectives.

Because of the 'balancing of central needs and objectives', while Indonesia's primary education and fertility reduction programmes both recorded a relatively high degree of success, there were also concerns about how genuinely independent much decision-making was. For example, while local communities and community leaders were

co-opted into supporting government programmes, there was little community discretion about what programmes they might pursue. Further, the linkage between local implementation and higher-level involvement was frequently used as a means of exercising political surveillance and control over local communities. As a result, 'many critics of development ... view participation as a degraded term, which has only served to "soften" top-downism and has been successfully stripped of its previously radical connotations' (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 111).

Co-operatives

The world's single biggest traded crop is coffee (following oil as the world largest traded commodity) and it is the dominant export of non-oil-producing developing countries. Yet, apart from plantations, most coffee is grown and harvested by small landholders who are entirely at the economic mercy of local buyers who, in turn, sell to the world's trading houses. The price of coffee is set not at the point of sale of the original product but in the world's stock exchanges. However, given the vast gulf in the price between coffee as a globally traded commodity and the price paid at the farm gate, it is perhaps the ideal product for a co-operative venture. Collective bargaining power that can increase the growers' price for coffee can make a major difference to the income of coffee farmers, yet barely register on the global pricing radar.

As a long-standing but much debated area of economic community development, co-operatives were originally designed to pool the resources of a number of local people, including labour and machinery, into a common enterprise. Co-operatives continue to demonstrate their usefulness, especially in the areas of better buying and selling power, and in removing middlemen from such arrangements. Co-operatives can also allow a division (specialization) of labour which, in principle, should allow for greater efficiencies of production (Fromm and Maccoby 1970: 210-11). Weitz also recognized the benefits of co-operative arrangements, noting that they could make available technology and equipment too costly for individuals, transform small-scale farmers into significant economic blocs, that they made production more efficient and that they could expand opportunities to acquire new markets and suppliers (Weitz 1986: 163; Trewin 2004). However, Weitz also noted that expectations of what co-operatives could achieve were sometimes overstated and that expectations exceeded their capacity to deliver, especially in the shorter term. This,

he said, needed to be clarified to co-operative participants to ensure that their expectations corresponded to an achievable reality and to preclude disappointments that could undermine the co-operative enterprise (Weitz 1986: 164).

Even with such clarification of the capacity of co-operatives to produce results, some members of co-operatives have also felt that their respective labour is not always adequately rewarded, especially for those who feel they contribute more but receive back a share based on the number of contributors but not the effort committed. This perceived or real reduction in incentive has led, in some instances, to a reduction in productivity, especially where co-operative members are rewarded at the same rate, regardless of how hard or otherwise they work. Compelled co-operative ventures, such as the 'Ujamaa (socialist) villages' of Tanzania in 1973-6, were often resented and, constructed as 'collectivization'; co-operatives were a social and economic failure in China and Vietnam, with overall losses in farm productivity due to the loss of smallholder incentive. In other cases, however, such as Israel's *kibbutz*, co-operative/communal ventures have been far more successful, primarily due to their voluntarism rather than compulsion. And the traditional 'mutual assistance' of many village communities has worked as one model for co-operation, bringing with it a powerful cultural recognition of the need for village units to work cohesively at important times of the year. But especially as an imposed model of local economic organization, co-operatives have had a very mixed record of success. Where co-operatives or co-operative endeavours have a higher degree of voluntarism, they also have a much higher degree of relative success.

In comparing co-operatives in Maharashtra and Bihar in India, and in Bangladesh, Blair noted that the success or failure of co-operative enterprises resulted from a combination of factors. The success of a co-operative included having adequate infrastructure and hence access to loans and the co-operative's financial structure (including having a built-in repayment system for loans to avoid defaults). Issues of land tenure, the size of landholdings as an incentive or otherwise towards co-operative behaviour, social cohesion, political culture and, of course, competence all contributed to success or failure (Blair 1997). Jain, Krishnamurthy and Tripathi also noted the issue of landholding size as a factor in co-operative success, indicating that small farmers were more likely to want to be involved in co-operatives. They also noted that, regarding co-operative finance, there was 'no evidence to suggest default is more frequent among small farmers than among large farmers' (Jain, Krishnamurthy and Tripathi 1985: 57).

Expecting the unexpected

Anthropologists have noted that one of the most critical factors affecting development programmes, especially those that are located within and run by the local community, is the impact of development on local patterns of behaviour and economic, social and political relations. That is, development programmes that alter a local environment are not free from flow-on effects, nor are they free of importing external values (such as consumer materialism), despite the implied belief that all societies can potentially adapt with relatively little disruption to the development paradigm. In seeking the advantages of development and in focusing on its potential for positive contribution, there is frequently too little concern for potential negative consequences, meaning that 'unexpected' problems can and do arise, sometimes to the extent of derailing the development process. That is 'social change often entails costs that are neither expected nor planned for' (Appel 1990: 271).

In recognizing that there are impacts from the local development process that are often not planned for, Appel noted seven principles of social change within the development context. They are:

1. Every act of development or modernization necessarily involves an act of destruction.
2. The introduction of a new activity always displaces an indigenous activity.
3. The adaptive potential of a population is limited, and every act of change temporarily reduces this potential until such time as that change has been completely dealt with.
4. Given such reduction, each act of change has the potential to cause physiological, psychological, and/or behavioural impairment in the subject population (such as stress or 'social bereavement').
5. Modernization erodes support and maintenance mechanisms for managing social stress.
6. Change always produces psychological loss, as well as compensation for such loss.
7. Change threatens the nutritional status of a population, and there is often disruption to traditional nutrition patterns. (Appel 1990: 272, see also Price and Pittman 2014: 183).

In identifying these factors, Appel also notes that they are all exacerbated by the speed of change. That is, the speed of change might not just have a quantifiable impact – that twice the rate of change will

produce twice the potential problems – but the quality of the impact can increase disproportionately to the rate of change: twice the rate of change could lead to a greater multiplier of related problems (1990: 273). The encouragement given to a shift to cash cropping, for instance, can damage local ecology and lead to a loss of subsistence crops. The loss of access to locally sourced food can and often does have a direct impact on the nutritional status of local communities (Appel 1990: 273–4). Not only is the variety of nutritional sources not always available in a purely cash context within a local community at the lower end of the development scale but cash crops may be subject to total failure (mixed crops tend to be subject to partial failure), hence depriving the grower of access to any return. Further, the trajectory of prices for cash crops, on the whole, declined in real terms between the late 1970s and around 2006, with regular dips in pricing depending on the extent of oversupply and relative competition on global markets. This then reduced the potential income to subsistence crop growers until the more recent price increase and, hence, their capacity to secure adequate supplies of food. Even when the sale price of agricultural commodities increased, this was often at the wholesale and retail end of the market, with little of the benefit being passed on to growers. This then returns to the observations made by Weitz, Warren, Friedman and Oliver: that in any community development process, there needs to be primary recognition given to the knowledge, values, needs and desires of the local people, which is what, at base, community development is supposed to be about.

Community development at work: the East Timor experience

In assessing the practical potential for community development, a significant example has been East Timor's Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP), 2000–2006, which stands as a useful illustration of the benefits and problems of such an enterprise. The CEP in East Timor showed what was available through community development but it also pointed to some of the problems that continue to trouble local development projects. The CEP was a World Bank-funded project (or series of three iterations of the same project) intended to stimulate community-level development projects and to encourage democratization at a local level in a society that, prior to its commencement, apart from one violent and externally organized election, had never previously experienced the democratic process.¹

The formative stages of the CEP came into being soon after the UN returned to East Timor in late September 1999, following the Indonesian army's 'scorched earth' policy in response to the UN-supervised ballot in which the East Timorese voted to separate from Indonesia. Already the equal poorest province in Indonesia, East Timor had more than 70 per cent of its buildings and infrastructure destroyed by the retreating Indonesian army and its militia proxies. Prior to the vote, East Timor had been under Indonesian occupation since late 1975, during which time there were limited attempts to introduce literacy and centrally planned development programmes, the latter mostly contributing to larger Indonesian-owned enterprises. After the first year of the incipient CEP, in November 2000, the US\$21.5 million programme largely shifted from the control of foreign employees to an indigenous management team. From this time, the small management team in Dili supported 60 sub-district facilitators, more than 800 village facilitators, and one district project accountant and a district monitor in every district, all of whom were East Timorese.

Recognizing East Timor's history of not previously having experienced democratic decision-making, the key CEP objective was to introduce and establish transparent, democratic, and accountable local structures in rural areas to make decentralized decisions about development projects. While providing the opportunity for local communities to rehabilitate basic infrastructure and revive local economies, the local councils established under CEP were intended to be a vehicle for the local expression of development needs and desires, and for implementing projects. This was, at the time, regarded as a good example of 'bottom-up' development planning and as representing a new policy direction by the World Bank, which funded the project. The former UN Transitional Authority in East Timor head of District Administration, Jarat Chopra, described the CEP as 'an introduction to local democracy, as well as a functioning form of self-determination in the reconstruction process' (La'o Hamutuk 2000).

After its first 12 months, the CEP had funded over 600 sub-projects and supported the formation of 57 sub-district councils. More than 400 village development councils were founded in all districts, between them accounting for a total of 6,270 representative council members. One notable aspect of this programme was that the council positions were equally divided between men and women (TFET 2000; World Bank 2000). This was in contrast to East Timor's deeply entrenched culture of male domination. However, while this division of representation by sex was broadly regarded as appropriate (not least by many

East Timorese women), it was a very clear example of the imposition of external values on a sometimes reluctant indigenous society:

In many ways, the CEP councils are creations of the 'international community' – albeit with the expressed support of the CNRT [Timorese National Resistance Council]. In this regard, they are not as legitimate and vibrant as socio-political structures that have emerged out of local, long-term processes. As the 'Joint Donor' report noted, '[A]t present the talent and energy at village level is more likely to be found around the chief and the old clandestine structures than within the council.' It is such structures that the report contends 'must be built upon if the country's urgent rural development problems are to be solved.' What the report calls their 'control mentality and gender bias,' however, run counter to international notions of democracy, as well as to the official positions of the CNRT. How the CEP will reconcile its praiseworthy principles with the need to respect indigenous beliefs, practices, and structures is an ongoing challenge. In this regard, working more closely with local and national organizations – such as East Timorese women's groups, for example – might go a long way toward realizing many of the CEP's goals. (La'o Hamutuk 2000: 6)

As a result of the post-ballot destruction, local communities largely chose to invest CEP funds in rebuilding or repairing community and personal infrastructure. Some 43 per cent of funding was allocated for the construction of community meeting halls, a quarter for small roads linking up to larger ones and for the repair of agricultural infrastructure, 15 per cent for the restoration of household assets (such as pots, pans, plates, cups, and/or spoons shared by villagers) and productive equipment (such as simple, communally owned farm equipment, lathes, or saws), 10 per cent for repair of water supply infrastructure (wells and pipes), and 7 per cent for schools or clinics. 'Vulnerable groups' and others, such as orphans and widows, were targeted for CEP support, as were local NGOs and the development of community radio (La'o Hamutuk 2000; Estefa 2001). (It has been common experience in developing countries since the advent of transistorization that radios are the cheapest and most accessible form of mass communication.) As noted by a then senior CEP manager, Chris Dureau, reflecting on the programme a decade later, it was a priority for traumatized communities that had lost everything to re-establish a sense of normality, by replacing some of that which had been destroyed, rather than embark on what were perceived as ambitious small business projects.²

While the CEP was seen as relatively successful in introducing democratization to East Timor, and in improving the social, economic and political position of women, it also had some failures. The introduction of localized democratization necessarily led to tension with traditional power structures and, in cases where traditional leaders prevailed, it served to strengthen their political position as well as offering them the chance to exploit economic opportunities offered by the projects. Similarly, although the CEP served to strengthen and, in principle, democratize local decision-making, there was an initial lack of co-ordination between villages, and between villages and the district-level administrations. This was, in large part, resolved through the establishment of District Advisory Boards providing such linkages. The position of women in such CEPs was also less successful, with a continuing 'culture of silence' on the part of many women (and expected by many men), and otherwise a lack of active participation on the part of many women. Further, not all CEP elections were as democratic as intended, with some 30 per cent of elections undertaken by 'acclamation' of candidates who had been chosen by local leaders. Villagers were also frequently inactive, in part due to a lack of training, in part due to lack of reward and in part due to concern over introducing opportunism to impoverished environments. According to Dureau, the CEP's project of dispersing money to districts initially undermined democratic principles, mostly because the processes intended to ensure participation were in many cases short-circuited to ensure the efficient dispersal of funds (Dureau 2003).

On balance, however, the CEP was widely regarded as having achieved a number of its goals, not least of which was the locally directed repair of the physical fabric of East Timorese society, as well as wider social and government capacity building (World Bank 2006b). Between the CEP and externally supervised elections for the legislature and the presidency (and following the vote for independence), notions of participatory and representative democracy were overwhelmingly enthusiastically received, and were becoming ingrained into the thinking of many, perhaps most, local people as a desirable and legitimate means of decision-making. The biggest threat to this process related not to the success or otherwise of the CEP but to the broader economic conditions of the fledgling state, the social dislocation caused by unmet economic expectations and the continuing social trauma of a quarter century of mass brutalization. Set against this backdrop, the CEP functioned to restore or establish some order of normality and, broadly conceived, 'progress'. However, as a programme with a finite tenure for external funding, there was real concern about its viability after its

external sources of funding ended. When that time came, the real test of the success of the programme was able to be measured. On balance, while the project did enhance the livelihoods of many in the shorter term, the original iteration left few lasting benefits.

The purpose of the CEP was to provide funding to communities for infrastructure and social activities. While the World Bank ran with the idea, the Asian Development Bank preferred an emphasis on governance. Communities that were funded tended to use the funds available to restore a sense of normality rather than thinking about long-term development strategies. It was initially a puzzle as to why communities opted for 'normalization' rather than development, but the pattern of recurrence showed that the message from communities in post-disaster or conflict places such as Aceh, Afghanistan, Laos, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands was that communities initially needed small-scale activities of limited duration. Efforts to establish 'proper' development activities in most cases were not successful. According to Dureau, 'We now know that in these situations the communities fall into the category of recovery rather than development' (personal communication 4 May 2011).

A decade on from the CEP, an evolved model is widely regarded to have generally worked well, if with some qualifications, and has become the benchmark model of community empowerment projects in a number of other countries. Indonesia followed with similar initiatives such as with the evolution of the National Program for Community Empowerment which became the Kecamatan Development Program, reflecting an increased menu of social activities and longer-term involvement consultation, and the Musrenbang (*Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan* – Multi Stakeholder Consultation Forum for Development Planning). These programmes offered progress in community involvement in local decision-making, which led to the establishment of locally determined projects including new roads, potable water, irrigation, health clinics and schools (World Bank 2010b).³ Similar projects were also developed in a number of other developing countries across Asia and Africa.

Local versus global

There is little doubt that the world is, in many ways, becoming a smaller, more connected and integrated place. Interestingly, however, while the world grows smaller, many local cultures are asserting themselves as an alternative to global standardization or homogenization.

This is nowhere more pronounced than in relation to states, many of which as developing countries have only made the transition to statehood in a qualified manner, perhaps reflecting their specific historical and material origins as colonies designed to suit imperial interests rather than local needs. The failure of many states to meet, or have the capacity to meet, the needs of many of their citizens, and the broad sweep of globalization, has meant that some communities have turned back to themselves for development, if in fact many of those ever ceased to do so. It is worth noting too, however, that globalization also offers the opportunity for increased networking among the marginalized and dispossessed, thereby helping to strengthen their respective positions. Like all such change, globalization can have positive as well as negative impacts, depending on which element is being referred to or how it is being employed (see Tesoriero 2010: 178).

For many in developing countries, what is called 'development' but which in other contexts might just be a simple, perhaps minor, improvement in standard of living, is the product of local conditions, effort, imagination and capacity. Governments can and do develop major infrastructure projects and sometimes these have a direct positive benefit on local people. But very often they do not and in too many cases the effects are deleterious, or are simply not sustained and, hence, become a larger economic burden. Yet, there is no quality of government that exceeds its desire to involve itself down to the most local level of its population, in part certainly to be able to claim some equality of care of its citizens but, almost as surely, to regulate and control them as well. It is at this point that there exists the juncture between state and local aspirations for development.

Similarly, there is little doubt that some local development projects have to fit into a wider development scheme. For example, and other than for initial educational purposes (learning how to learn is often done best in a 'home' language), it would be rather pointless developing a local educational facility if the language being taught was not consistent with a wider literacy programme: so too a road project, in which roads to a proposed bridge faced each other at points that did not correspond. Equally, however, the one-size-fits-all model of development can also fail to address specific local needs, impose inappropriate development and silence the voice of the local community. Even with the best of intentions, external authorities can only rarely presume to know how people think without actually asking them. Added to this are all the usual inefficiencies and disengagements of a larger hierarchical or bureaucratic structure, the continuation of patron-client relations, modified forms of economic status and deference, and

the consequent potential for corruption and reduction of service at the final point of the process.

It is not accurate to say that all the problems of development decision-making can be resolved by devolving responsibility for such decisions to the local level. Even amongst local communities there are specific interests, conflicts and tensions and a lack of capacity that can and do derail local decision-making processes, or which default to traditional, often non-representative and usually exclusive power structures. There are also problems with awareness, education and technical competence. Yet, in acknowledging such issues, the legitimacy of direct representation in local decision-making remains valid, the sensitivity and awareness to local needs, concerns and values is most acute at the local level. So too is the capacity for inclusiveness in and, hence, ownership of the development process greatest at the local level. Development is not just about the accumulation of material resources but about the allocation of such resources. In societies that have less than perfectly representative political systems, the process that determines such allocation is most sensitive to local needs when decisions are taken at the local or community level.

Notes

1. Much of the information regarding East Timor is taken from the author's direct experience of regular visits since the country voted for independence in 1999.
2. Discussion with Chris Dureau, Baucau, Timor-Leste, April 2011.
3. The Kecamatan Development Program was run between 1998 and 2009 by the Ministry of Home Affairs in conjunction with the World Bank. Its key principles included being a decentralized, participatory and transparent programme in which residents could suggest their own local spending priorities. See www.worldbank.org/id/kdp (accessed 26 February 2016).

Chapter 9

Gender and Development

Janet Hunt

In the early post-war years, when the concept of 'development' evolved, issues of gender equity were not considered relevant to the economic development of Third World countries, and it took some time before that changed. Today, significant advances have been made in recognition of the importance of gender in development due to research and activism by feminist researchers and development workers. This is particularly true since the United Nations Decade for Women 1975–85, and the UN World Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995, both of which had considerable impact on development thinking. Yet following the impacts of debt and adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s and the multiple crises of finance, food and energy in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and despite a global commitment to the MDGs, the challenge of making development gender equitable remains significant.

Despite some progress in the last 25 years, gender inequality remains a feature of every region, though it is most pronounced in South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Women are under-represented in governmental decision-making in most countries, holding only about 22 per cent of all seats in the world's national parliaments.¹ Although women's formal labour force participation has increased in recent decades (before declining in some regions since the global financial crisis), we have not enjoyed equal wages or equal employment opportunities with men and we undertake a high proportion of the unpaid care work in society. And while 197 countries have now ratified the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), women do not in practice enjoy the same legal rights as men in many countries. In particular women are discriminated against in areas relating to financial and economic resources, such as their right to land and property and their right to conduct business independently (UNDP 1995; UNIFEM 2000; World Bank 2001b; United Nations 2009, 2010). Thus women are more vulnerable to poverty than men, especially as a result of widowhood, separation or divorce, and the